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Chao Li, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2019
In the age of Big Data, releasing private data at a future point in time is critical for var-
ious applications. Such self-emerging data release requires the data to be protected until
a prescribed data release time and be automatically released to the target recipient at the
release time. While straight-forward centralized approaches such as cloud storage services
may provide a simple way to implement self-emerging data release, unfortunately, they are
limited to a single point of trust and involves a single point of control.
This dissertation proposes new decentralized designs of self-emerging data release systems
using large-scale peer-to-peer (P2P) networks as the underlying infrastructure to eliminate a
single point of trust or control. The first part of the dissertation presents the design of decen-
tralized self-emerging data release systems using two different P2P network infrastructures,
namely Distributed Hash Table (DHT) and blockchain. The second part of this dissertation
proposes new mechanisms for supporting two key functionalities of self-emerging data release,
namely (i) enabling the release of self-emerging data to blockchain-based smart contracts for
facilitating a wide range of decentralized applications and (ii) supporting a cost-effective
gradual release of self-emerging data in the decentralized infrastructure. We believe that the
outcome of this dissertation would contribute to the development of decentralized security
primitives and protocols in the context of timed release of private data.
Keywords: data privacy, decentralization, timed release, blockchain, DHT, smart contract.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
In the age of Big Data, releasing private data at a future point in time is critical for various
applications. Such private data release requires the data to be protected until a prescribed
data release time and be automatically released to the target recipient at the release time.
The hidden private data appears to emerge by itself to the data recipient at the release time
without any assistance from the data sender, and thus has been referred to as self-emerging
data [81, 82, 83, 84].
Such self-emerging data is widely found in practice. Examples include secure auction
systems (bidding information needs protection until all bids arrive), copyrights-aware data
publishing (data is automatically released when the copyright expires), secure voting mech-
anisms (votes are not allowed to be accessed until the end of the polling process), and
post/tweet scheduler (schedule content to automatically post at optimal times). In the
above examples, self-emerging data is released in an all-or-nothing manner, indicating that
the complete information carried by the hidden data is revealed at a single release time. Self-
emerging data may also get gradually released through multiple release times, allowing the
carried information to be gradually revealed over time. Examples include data of individuals
with privacy requirements that relax over time [77]. For instance, personal data of individ-
uals (e.g., location trajectory patterns, shopping patterns, travel history) collected during
their lifetime may be sensitive during the childhood and youth life of an individual, however,
the sensitivity of such data may decrease as the individual ages and may drop significantly
after the end of the individuals life and a few decades after the end of the individuals life.
Centralized storage systems such as cloud storage services [1, 7, 8] may provide a simple
and straight-forward approach for implementing self-emerging data release. The storage
service provider may simply keep the sensitive data until the prescribed release time and
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make it available at the release time. However, such a centralized approach significantly
limits the data protection to a single point of trust and a single point of control. Even in
cases when the service providers are trustworthy, such centralized models lead to channels of
attacks beyond the control of service providers for an adversary to breach the security and
privacy of the data. It includes insider attacks [34, 98], external attacks on the centralized
data infrastructure, malware and large-scale denial-of-service attacks [3, 10]. In 2014, 28% of
the respondents of the US State of Cybercrime Survey [34] reported being victims of insider
attacks and 32% reported that insider attacks were more damaging than attacks performed
by outsiders.
One possible method for reducing risks encountered by the use of a single centralized
service provider is to replace the single service provider with multiple service providers and
apply techniques such as secret sharing scheme [114] to make the multiple service providers
jointly implement self-emerging data release. However, as long as the identities of the service
providers are public, adversaries may still easily locate the service providers and try to
compromise them through various types of attacks. As a result, the attack resilience of
using multiple service providers highly depends on the number of involved service providers,
while an increased number of service providers usually also make the cost of running the
service get higher.
Motivated by the aforementioned discussion, this dissertation proposes new decentralized
designs of self-emerging data release systems. Inspired by BitTorrent [25] and Tor [123],
we observe that the properties of large-scale peer-to-peer (P2P) networks help resolve the
challenges encountered by the previous methods. In a P2P network, each peer is able to
work as a service provider of releasing self-emerging data. Then, the service providers of a
specific service request could be a small group of randomly selected peers, whose identities
are hard to be disclosed due to the pseudonymity and anonymity of P2P networks. Thus,
attacks targeting the service providers of a specific service request, as launched in the previous
methods where the identities of service providers are public, can hardly be successfully carried
out in the context of P2P networks because locating these service providers is extremely
difficult considering the size of large-scale P2P networks.
In this dissertation, we study the use of two well-known types of P2P networks, namely
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Distributed Hash Table (DHT) [91, 119] and blockchain [100, 128], as the underlying infras-
tructure of designing self-emerging data release systems.
The dissertation starts from investigating approaches to implement self-emerging data
release using P2P networks running DHT protocols. The classical DHT protocols such as
Chord [119] and Kademlia [91] have been widely used to enable efficient lookup among peers
of a P2P network. The protocols require each peer to maintain links to a few neighbors
(maximum O(log n) neighbors in a network of size n), so a message corresponding to a
given key can be routed within O(log n) hops from any peer in the network to a peer closest
to the key. With such protocols, self-emerging data can get secretly routed from the sender
to the recipient along a pre-determined pseudo-random routing path so that the data can be
recovered exactly at the release time by the recipient. However, we observe that the use of a
DHT infrastructure may lead to new challenges that are specific to P2P networks, including
churn (i.e. nodes join and leave the P2P network) and new attacks relevant to the Sybil
attack [48]. To resolve these challenges under the assumption that DHT peers may behave
either honestly or maliciously, we propose to split self-emerging data into multiple fragments
using erasure coding [126] and leverage the increased redundancy to make the data resist
against the aforementioned threats.
After studying the use of a DHT infrastructure, the dissertation employs a blockchain
infrastructure [128] that offers more robust and attractive features including decentralized
democratized trust and native cryptocurrencies with monetary value. A blockchain is a
distributed ledger, which publicly records data as a chain of blocks with each block containing
the hash of its previous block. To falsify data in a blockchain, adversaries must hold enormous
resources (e.g., computation power in Proof-of-Work consensus protocol [100], amount of
stake in Proof-of-Stake consensus protocol [74]) that can compete with the sum of resources
owned by the rest peers in the network. The great difficulty in successfully launching such
attacks solidifies peers’ confidence that the data recorded in a blockchain is verifiable and
permanent, thus creating a decentralized trust among the mutually distrusting peers. This
decentralized trust, fueled by the monetary value of native cryptocurrencies, provides new
possibilities of resolving the challenges of churn and attacks in the new context of blockchain
infrastructure. Instead of requiring the majority of peers to perform honestly as assumed
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in the context of DHT infrastructure, the blockchain infrastructure allows us to assume
that all the peers are adversaries with rationality [47, 61, 62, 103], which is more in line
with practical market rules. The protocols of implementing self-emerging data release in the
blockchain infrastructure can then be programmed as an enforceable smart contract [128]
through which each peer serving for a specific service request needs to pay a certain amount
of cryptocurrency as the security deposit. In this way, we are able to make rational peers
always choose to honestly comply with the protocols, instead of tending to perform any
misbehavior violating the protocols, as such misbehaviors will make their security deposit
get confiscated.
Having demonstrated feasibility of releasing self-emerging data in the blockchain infras-
tructure, our further research about the blockchain infrastructure shows that it is possible
to release self-emerging data not only to the accounts belonging to peers, but also to the
accounts belonging to smart contracts. The rapid development of blockchain techniques has
made smart contracts get widely adopted as the back-end logic for running the emerging
decentralized applications (DAPP) such as decentralized voting and bidding systems [2, 92].
A mechanism that supports releasing self-emerging data to smart contracts can thus facili-
tate a wide range of decentralized applications, allowing users to schedule their target smart
contracts to be automatically executed at future points of time, without revealing their
private input data (i.e., self-emerging data) before the expected execution time. However,
unlike accounts belonging to peers, the smart contract accounts are passive and transpar-
ent, making the previous solutions not applicable. To overcome this difficulty, we design
a new mechanism that makes self-emerging data get released to a proxy contract deployed
by the user, which then automatically calls the target smart contract on behalf of the user.
The mechanism jointly applies techniques of data redundancy and cryptocurrency-driven
enforcement and can handle rational adversaries and malicious adversaries altogether.
Finally, having explored the system design using different types of P2P network infras-
tructures and the release of self-emerging data to different types of recipients, the dissertation
investigates the possible options of inputting the self-emerging data to the designed system
under different circumstances. Specifically, we find that in the circumstance of gradually re-
leasing self-merging data through multiple release times, for the purpose of reducing the cost
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of maintaining multiple snapshots of large-size private data, it would be more desirable to per-
turb the data in a reversible way using perturbation keys so that a single maintained snapshot
is capable of revealing multiple levels of information at multiple prescribed release times. Un-
fortunately, existing privacy-preserving data perturbation mechanisms [38, 49, 54, 71, 73, 85]
do not meet our requirements because the randomness involved in these mechanisms makes
the perturbed data hard to be recovered. Therefore, we propose a new set of mechanisms that
applies perturbation keys as the seeds of a generator of pseudo-randomness and replaces any
randomness involved in the conventional data perturbation mechanisms with such pseudo-
randomness so that the same keys, upon being released by the designed system, could be
used by the recipients to reverse the perturbation process and reduce the perturbation level.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed mechanisms in two representative scenar-
ios of gradually releasing self-emerging data, namely association data disclosure and location
data disclosure.
In the rest of this chapter, we first outline the key research tasks of this dissertation and
then briefly present the organization of the rest chapters.
1.1 OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH TASKS
This dissertation includes three research components and has four research tasks. The three
research components are shown in Figure 1 as Infrastructure, Output and Input.
Infrastructure: The Infrastructure research component refers to the study of using different
types of large-scale P2P networks as the underlying infrastructure of designing decentralized
self-emerging data release systems. Depending on the features of the underlying P2P network
infrastructure, the system design may encounter different challenges and require different so-
lutions. Both DHT and blockchain have been widely used for establishing P2P networks with
scale, geographic distribution, and decentralization. For example, the Vuze DHT network
contains over 1 million nodes [56] and the Ethereum blockchain network consists of more
than 10,000 nodes distributed all over the world [4]. However, DHT and blockchain involve
several key similarities and differences:
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Figure 1: An overview of research tasks
• Design objectives : In short, DHT is a lookup service designed for enabling efficient com-
munication among nodes in a P2P network while blockchain is a distributed ledger man-
aged by the entire P2P network to create a distributed trust. For more technical details
about DHT and blockchain, please refer to Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively.
• Storage: Both DHT nodes and blockchain nodes can store data locally. However, data
stored in the distributed ledger of blockchain is publicly revealed to all blockchain nodes.
Therefore, special attention needs to be taken to avoid storing private data publicly on
a blockchain.
• Communication: Both DHT nodes and blockchain nodes can build private channels with
other nodes. However, any data associated with the blockchain is publicly revealed to
all blockchain nodes. Examples include inputs and outputs of calling a function within
a smart contract. Therefore, to leverage the decentralized trust offered by blockchain,
we need to pay attention to any direct or indirect interaction with the blockchain, even
if we don’t intend to store data on it.
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• Cryptocurrency : Unlike DHT networks, blockchain networks such as Bitcoin [100] and
Ethereum [128] offer native cryptocurrencies (i.e., Bitcoin and Ether) that can be lever-
aged as monetary incentives and security deposits in protocol design. Because of this,
protocols designed for the DHT-based decentralized self-emerging data release system
mainly rely on increased data redundancy to prevent the hidden data from being stolen
by adversaries before the prescribed release time, whereas in the blockchain networks, we
can additionally leverage the enforcement driven by the monetary incentive and penalty
to assist the protocol design and system development.
After analyzing the Infrastructure research component, we have figured out that both
the DHT infrastructure and the blockchain infrastructure are qualified P2P network infras-
tructure of designing decentralized self-emerging data release systems, so we set the research
task T-1 and T-2 to investigate the two options, respectively.
Output : The Output research component refers to the study of releasing self-emerging data
to different types of recipients. Protocols designed for releasing self-emerging data to a
certain type of recipients may not be applicable to other types of recipients. The DHT
infrastructure only involves a single type of recipients while the blockchain infrastructure
involves two types of recipients. In the DHT infrastructure, recipients simply refer to the
peers of the DHT network, who need to control DHT nodes to actively collect the self-
emerging data at the release time. However, in the blockchain infrastructure supporting
smart contracts (e.g., Ethereum), it is possible to release self-emerging data to two types of
recipients that run External Owned Account (EOA) or Contract Account (CA), respectively.
To be brief, an EOA account is controlled by a peer of the blockchain network through a pair
of public/private keys while a CA account is controlled by a smart contract. Recently, smart
contracts have been widely used for running the back-end logic for the emerging decentralized
applications (DAPP). Supporting the release of self-emerging data to smart contracts can
thus facilitate a wide range of decentralized applications. There are two main differences
between EOA and CA accounts that are relevant to the design of decentralized self-emerging
data release system:
• Transparency : A peer controlling an EOA account in a blockchain network has similar
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abilities of a peer controlling a DHT node in a DHT network, meaning that the peer
can keep the received self-emerging data in secret by obtaining it from private channels
and storing it locally. In contrast, a smart contract controlling a CA account is a piece
of transparent program code recorded in the blockchain, meaning that the received self-
emerging data must also be recorded in the blockchain and thus get publicly revealed to
the entire network.
• Passiveness : A peer controlling an EOA account can actively participate in the self-
emerging data release protocol (e.g., initiate a conversation with other accounts) while
a smart contract controlling a CA account can only passively wait for transactions sent
by other accounts to invoke its inside code (i.e., listen to incoming transactions).
After exploring the output research component, we have figured out the differences of releas-
ing self-emerging data to different types of recipients and the need of new approaches that
support releasing self-emerging data to the smart contract accounts. Therefore, we set the
research task T-3 to resolve this problem.
Input : The Input research component refers to the study of the possible options of inputting
the self-emerging data to the designed system. Under different circumstances, the self-
emerging data may be expected to be released in a single time (all-or-nothing release) or
multiple times (gradual release). Generally speaking, there are three options to input self-
emerging data to the designed system:
• Plaintext : As the basic option, the sender of private data can directly input the plaintext
of private data to the system. Since the data needs to be stored by the P2P nodes and
also routed among the nodes, such a straightforward solution may result in a high cost
of storing and transferring large-size private data (e.g., a healthcare dataset), which in
turn affects both the security and scalability of the self-emerging data release system.
• Encryption key : To eliminate the drawbacks of using plaintext, one option is to encrypt
the private data with a key and only input the encryption key to the system. Such
an encryption-based scheme can be adopted in both all-or-nothing release and gradual
release. Specifically, in the all-or-nothing release, private data only needs to be released
for once, so only a single snapshot of the encrypted data needs to be maintained by either
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data sender or recipient to make the data available at the release time. However, in the
gradual release, to gradually increase the utility of the disclosed information over time,
multiple snapshots of the encrypted data needs to be maintained with each snapshot
corresponding to a different level of utility, which may result in a high cost of storing
and maintaining large-size private data.
• Perturbation key : The last option is to perturb the private data with privacy-preserving
data perturbation mechanisms [38, 49, 54, 71, 73, 85] to change the utility level of the
information carried by the perturbed data. Since the perturbation level can be gradually
decreased to increase the utility level over time, the perturbation-based solution seems
to be a proper way of overcoming the issues of high storage/maintenance cost in the
encryption-based solution. Unfortunately, existing privacy-preserving data perturbation
mechanisms do not meet the requirements of designing decentralized self-emerging data
release system for two reasons: (1) data perturbed through existing schemes cannot be
de-perturbed to recover data utility; (2) existing perturbation schemes are not designed
to be implemented through keys.
After analyzing the Input research component, we have seen the lack of proper solutions
for supporting the gradual release of self-emerging data with low cost, so we determine to
develop such solutions in the last research task T-4 .
In summary, we make the following contributions in this dissertation:
• First, we propose new designs of self-emerging data release using two different types of
large-scale P2P networks as the underlying infrastructure.
• Second, we propose and develop solutions for supporting the release of self-emerging data
to different types of recipients in P2P networks that facilitate both traditional centralized
applications and emerging decentralized applications.
• Finally, we propose and design cost-effective techniques for gradually releasing self-
emerging data by using perturbation keys as inputs. We develop a suite of techniques
for supporting cost-effective gradual release of two representative types of private data,
namely association data and location data.
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1.2 CHAPTERS OVERVIEW
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follow: Chapter 2 provides literature review.
Then, in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, the DHT infrastructure and blockchain infrastructure are
investigated, respectively. After that, in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, we discuss the techniques
for supporting the release of self-emerging data to smart contracts and supporting cost-
effective gradual release of self-emerging data, respectively. Finally, we conclude and present
future directions in Chapter 7.
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2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter, we provide the literature review. Specifically, in Section 2.1, we provide
a review of the literature about timed-release of private data to demonstrate the need for
decentralized solutions of releasing private data in future. Then, in Section 2.2, we review
recent work of enforcing behaviors performed by the participants of secure multi-party com-
putation protocols using cryptocurrencies, which inspires the use of cryptocurrency-driven
enforcement in our design of blockchain-based self-emerging data release system. Finally, in
Section 2.3, we review the representative privacy-preserving data perturbation mechanisms
to illustrate that the existing techniques fail to meet the requirements of gradually releasing
self-emerging data with low cost.
2.1 TIMED-RELEASE OF PRIVATE DATA
The problem of revealing private data only after a certain time in the future has been
researched for more than two decades. The problem was first described by May as timed-
release encryption (TRE) in 1992 [90] and has intrigued many researchers in the field of
cryptography since then. Existing work on this topic can be divided into three categories,
namely time-lock puzzle, time server and reference time clock.
Time-lock puzzle: The first category of existing solutions was designed to make data
recipients solve a mathematical puzzle, called time-lock puzzle, before reading the mes-
sages [24, 28, 109]. The time-lock puzzle can only be solved with sequential operations, thus
making multiple computers no better than a single computer. In addition, since the time-lock
puzzle scheme requires no third party, there is no single point of trust problem. However, the
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time-lock puzzle scheme suffers from two key drawbacks. First, due to increasing advance-
ments in computing hardware and hardware performance, the time taken by such puzzle
computation is not determinate and hence these solutions cannot tackle the situations that
demand the data be released with a precise release time. Second, the puzzle computation is
associated with a significant computation cost. Incurring such high computation costs for a
large big data infrastructure does not lead to a scalable cost-effective solution.
Time server: The second category of existing solutions relies on a third party, also known
as a time server, to release the protected information at the release time in future. The
information, sometimes called time trapdoors, can be used by recipients to decrypt the
encrypted message [26, 35, 40, 72, 76, 97, 109]. Initially, the third party was designed to
actively interact with data sources and data recipients to complete the process [44, 90, 96,
109]. Although the interactive third party scheme can release data at an accurate release
time, the known identities of the data sources and recipients may cause security issues.
Because of this, researchers have focused on developing timed-release encryption (TRE)
based on non-interactive time server. In 2003, Mont et al.[97] proposed the non-interactive
TRE model based on quadratic residues (QR-TRE). However, the confidentiality of private
data sending through their system highly relied on the trustworthiness of the time server
because the time server can decrypt the data before the release time. In 2005, Chan and
Blake [26] proposed a scalable, server-passive, user-anonymous TRE scheme based on bilinear
pairing, which only asked the time server to be curious. Based on their work, the formal
model of TRE was proposed by Cathalo et al. [32]. In 2007, more efficient TRE schemes were
proposed [68, 35], which significantly reduced the operation cost and also allowed replacing
a single time server with multiple servers. In 2008, the non-interactive TRE was formally
defined in [40]. After that, researchers focused on developing variations of the standard
TRE model to extend its range of application. For example, the TRE model with pre-
open capability was proposed in [99, 76], which allowed the encrypted information to be
decrypted before the release time in some emergent situations. The TRE model supporting
one-to-many service was proposed in [50], which allowed the encrypted information to be
decrypted by multiple recipients at the release time. Besides, in standard TRE, the single
time trapdoor sent by the time server may be easily lost or missed by the recipient. To solve
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this, time-specific encryption (TSE) [106, 72], as an extension of TRE, was proposed to split
time to slices so that any time trapdoor released during one time slice can be used to decrypt
the information. Although the efficiency and flexibility of time-server-based approaches have
been constantly improved, the time server in this model has to be trusted to not collude with
recipients so that encrypted messages cannot be entered before release time. This restriction
makes this set of solutions involve a single point of trust.
Reference time clock: The third category of existing solutions uses blockchain [100]. The
difficulty of PoW (proof-of-work) can be diversely adjusted to change the average generation
time of each block to the desired value, which makes blockchain to be a reference time
clock with correctness guaranteed by the distributed network. Therefore, by combining
witness encryption [55] with blockchain [69, 87], one can leverage the computation power of
PoW in blockchain to decrypt a message after a certain number of new blocks have been
generated. However, the current implementation of witness encryption is far from practical,
which requires an astronomical decryption time estimated to be 2100 seconds [87].
To sum up, there is a need for a scalable and cost-effective solution for releasing private
data to future, which should not involve a single point of trust. This dissertation aims at
filling this gap by designing decentralized self-emerging data release systems using the P2P
network infrastructure.
2.2 CRYPTOCURRENCY-DRIVEN ENFORCEMENT
The idea of using cryptocurrency to enforce participants of a protocol to perform desirable
behaviors was first proposed in 2014 by Andrychowicz et al. [16], who designed a timed
commitment protocol using Bitcoin [100] for the purpose of resolving the fair Secure Multi-
party Computation (SMC) problem more efficiently. After that, extensive follow-ups [15, 20,
94] have further improved the efficiency of resolving fair SMC problems with blockchain and
the effectiveness of the cryptocurrency-driven enforcement in protocol design has been widely
recognized. Since the blockchain-based systems designed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 of this
dissertation mainly rely on the cryptocurrency-driven enforcement inspired by the previous
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research of the blockchain-based SMC to make the designed systems resist against possible
misbehaviors violating the protocols, in this subsection, we review the existing work relevant
to the blockchain-based SMC. Before going to the details, we first present the differences
between the blockchain-based SMC and the traditional SMC.
The traditional SMC, originally proposed by Yao [131] and Goldreich et al. [60], allows
multiple mutually distrusting parties to obtain the output of a function using their private
data as function input without needing a trusted third party. According to [104], the compu-
tation is performed in a way that 1) the output is correct and 2) cheating parties will not be
able to learn any information about the honest parties’ inputs. Unlike the traditional SMC,
the blockchain-based SMC allows the inputs to be revealed and focuses more on the fairness
among the parties [16, 20, 15, 94]. For example, in the coin tossing problem [27, 16] where
two parties (say Alice and Bob) want to jointly generate a value that has equal probability
to be 0 or 1 (i.e., a random bit), Alice and Bob can send a randomly selected bit (bA and bB)
to each other, so that the output of function b = bA ⊕ bB will become a shared random bit
when at least one of bA and bB is random. To make the above protocol fair, bA and bB should
be received simultaneously. Otherwise, in case that Bob receives bA first, he can select bB
based on the value of bA to get desired b. The solution for resolving such fairness problem is
called commitment-based SMC protocol [27], which usually consists of two phases, namely
Commit and Open. During the Commit phase, each participant should make the hash of a
secret h(s) public while keeping the secret s unknown to other participants. Then, during
the Open phase, each participant should disclose the secret s. One fundamental limitation of
the commitment-based SMC protocol is the lack of enforcement. In the coin tossing example,
Alice and Bob may make a bet. Alice agrees to pay Bob 1 USD when b = 0 and Bob agrees
to pay Alice 1 USD when b = 1. However, during the Open phase, when Bob sees bA and
computes b = 1, he may abort the protocol by rejecting disclosing bB. Even if Bob discloses
bB and loses the bet, he may still reject to pay 1 USD to Alice. In both these situations, the
protocol becomes unfair to Alice.
In 2014, Andrychowicz et al. [15] proposed to use Bitcoin [100] to design a timed com-
mitment protocol for the fair lottery, which is actually an implementation of the fair SMC.
In brief, during the Commit phase, the committer should create a Commit transaction with
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Figure 2: Commitment-based secure computation using Ethereum
both a monetary deposit and the hash of his secret in it. The committer should also send
a PayDeposit transaction to the recipient, which contains both a timed lock and the sig-
nature of the committer. Then, before the end of Open phase, the committer can create
an Open transaction with the secret to get back the deposit, otherwise, after the deadline,
the recipient can use the PayDeposit transaction to get the deposit paid by the committer.
This bitcoin-based protocol forces the committer to disclose the secret for not losing the
deposit. It can also force the committer to respect the function result by automatically
operating the committer’s digital asset (i.e., Bitcoin) based on the function result. Recently,
Miller et al. [94] proved that commitment-based SMC protocols designed over Ethereum can
offer better performance because Ethereum begins with a ‘Turing-complete’ language for
general-purpose use. We show an example of the commitment-based secure computation us-
ing Ethereum in Figure 2. In the example, during the Commit phase [t1, t2], the three users
u1, u2, u3 should send hashed secrets and deposits to the smart contract. Then, during the
Open phase [t2, t3], the three users should send their secrets to the smart contract. Finally, at
the end of Open phase, namely t3, the smart contract will verify the secrets received during
the Open phase with the hashed secrets received during the Commit phase, compute the
function results and execute pre-determined operations based on the computation results. If
a secret fails to pass the verification, the corresponding deposit will be confiscated.
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2.3 PRIVACY-PRESERVING DATA PERTURBATION
The problem of privacy-preserving data perturbation has been studied extensively in the
framework of statistical databases. Samarati and Sweeney [112],[121] introduced the k-
anonymity approach which has led to some new techniques and definitions such as l-diversity
[88] and t-closeness [85]. There had been some work on anonymizing graph datasets with the
goal of publishing statistical information without revealing information of individual records.
Backstrom et al. [18] show that in fully censored graphs where identifiers are removed, a
large enough known subgraph can be located in the overall graph with high probability.
Ghinita et al. present an anonymization scheme for anonymizing sparse high-dimensional
data using permutation-based methods [59] by considering that sensitive attributes are rare
and at most one sensitive attribute is present in each group. The safe grouping techniques
proposed in [22, 42] consider the scenario of retaining graph structure but aim at protecting
privacy when labeled graphs are released.
Based on the concept of differential privacy[49], there had been many work focused on
publishing sensitive datasets through differential privacy constraints [38, 54, 124]. Differential
privacy had also been applied to protecting sensitive information in graph datasets such
that the released information does not reveal the presence of a sensitive element [43, 71,
111]. Recent work had focused on publishing graph datasets through differential privacy
constraints so that the published graph maintains as many structural properties as possible
while providing the required privacy [111].
The problem has also been researched extensively in the area of location data disclo-
sure. The representative location data perturbation schemes includes dummies [75], spatial
location cloaking [19, 39, 58, 70, 95, 130] and landmark objects [67]. Also, recent work
has studied the location privacy problem by perturbing the location information based on
differential privacy constraints prior to disclosure [14, 31].
In the past, based on k-anonymity [122], there have been many work using spatial loca-
tion cloaking to protect location privacy. CliqueCloak algorithm proposed in 2004 considered
the individual user’s personalized privacy requirement for the first time [57]. A grid-based
cloaking framework, Casper further extended this model with a privacy-aware query proces-
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sor [95]. Subsequently, a directed-graph based cloaking algorithm was proposed to improve
the success rate of anonymization [130] and the Hilbert Cloak algorithm uses a Hilbert curve
to fill the whole area and track users [58]. While these techniques were designed for mobile
users traveling on Euclidean space, recent work has considered the location cloaking problem
under a constrained road network model [125, 132].
We find that these existing techniques cannot effectively support the gradual release
of private data with low cost, so we propose to design a new set of mechanisms that can
make private data get gradually released through the decentralized self-emerging data release
system in a cost-effective approach. Details about this will be presented in Chapter 6.
17
3.0 SELF-EMERGING DATA RELEASE USING DISTRIBUTED HASH
TABLES
In this chapter, we explore the design of a self-emerging data release system using large-scale
Distributed Hash Table (DHT) [119] networks as the underlying infrastructure. The research
of this chapter corresponds to the research task T-1. Before going to the details, we briefly
answer the key research questions of accomplishing this research task.
Research goals: The goal of the system designed in this chapter is to ensure private data
to be protected until a release time set by a DHT node (i.e., sender) and also enable the
self-emergence of the private data to another DHT node (i.e., recipient) at the release time.
Properties of DHT nodes: In the system designed in this chapter, all participants of
the self-emerging data release, including data senders, data recipients and service providers,
are peers of a DHT network, who need to run DHT nodes to take any action. For short,
DHT allows nodes in a P2P network to efficiently communicate and transfer data with
other nodes. A DHT node has the ability to communicate with other nodes through private
channels established with basic cryptographic techniques and also the ability to locally store
data received from other nodes. Besides, a DHT node has the freedom to choose to join and
leave the network at any time.
Adversary models: We note that the design objectives can be significantly challenged by
adversaries controlling a sizable proportion of the DHT network. When a sufficient number
of DHT nodes has been compromised by an adversary, the adversary can either release the
hidden data before the prescribed release time (release-ahead attack) or destroy the hidden
data altogether (drop attack). These two specific attacks in combination with the traditional
churn issues [120] in DHTs constitute significant challenges to the design of the system.
Thus, ensuring high resilience to churn and to release-ahead attacks and drop attacks is
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also a central objective of the system design. In this chapter, we divide DHT nodes into
two categories, namely honest nodes and malicious nodes. In short, we assume that honest
nodes may join and leave the network at any time but they will follow the designed protocols
as expected when they are in the network. In addition, data locally stored at honest nodes
is unavailable to the adversary. In contrast, malicious nodes are the ones controlled by the
adversary, so these nodes can arbitrarily violate the designed protocols and data locally
stored at these nodes is known by the adversary.
Technical approaches: The reliability of the self-emerging data release system established
over the DHT infrastructure primarily replies on the increased redundancy of the private
data. DHT nodes can freely join and leave the P2P network and there is no general and
effective approach to enforce behaviours performed by DHT nodes. As a result, requesting
a single DHT node to store the private data is not a robust way of hiding private data in
the DHT network because the data will get lost once that DHT node leaves the network.
Therefore, to make data survive in the highly dynamic DHT network, data needs to be
replicated to make the replicas stored at different nodes so that the recipient can still receive
the self-emerging data at the release time even if a fraction of the nodes storing the replicas
have left the network or have been compromised by adversaries. By jointly considering
challenges of churn and attacks, the protocols designed in this chapter leverage erasure
coding [126] to split private data into a group of fragments and make the fragments keep
moving among DHT nodes without sticking to fixed positions.
Evaluation: We conduct extensive experimental evaluation of the proposed protocol using
Overlay Weaver DHT toolkit [115] and the results demonstrate that the proposed erasure-
coding-based schemes provide high resilience to both release-ahead and drop attacks as well
as to the churn issues in DHT.
In the rest of this chapter, we first provide the system overview and analyze security
challenges in Section 3.1. Then, we present the self-emerging data release protocol in detail
in Section 3.2. After that, we experimentally evaluate the proposed solution in Section 3.3.
Finally, we summarize this chapter in Section 3.4.
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Figure 3: DHT-based decentralized self-emerging data release system
3.1 SYSTEM OVERVIEW
In this section, we first present the DHT-based decentralized self-emerging data release
system and then discuss the main security challenges, including the adversary models and
churn.
3.1.1 DHT-based decentralized self-emerging data release system
There are four major entities in the DHT-based self-emerging data release system, namely
the data senders, the data recipients, the DHT network and the cloud, as shown in Figure
3. As the owner of private data, the data senders want to protect the data stored in the
cloud from being accessed until a pre-defined data release time. The data, however, needs
to be accessible to the recipients after the release time. As discussed in Section 1.1, the data
senders may use a secret key to encrypt/perturb their data before uploading to the cloud
and use the DHT network to make the secret key ‘disappear’ before the future data release
time. They then need the secret key automatically appears to the recipients at the release
time, allowing the recipients to recover the protected data.
If we denote the start time as ts and the expected future release time as tr, we can express
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the entire time period that the data owner wants to make the secret key disappear as T . It is
referred to as the emerging time period as the key is emerging from the DHT to the intended
recipient during T . At start time ts, the sender process her data with a secret key and sends
the encrypted/perturbed data and the key to the cloud and the DHT network, respectively
(shown as ‘initialize’ in Figure 3). During the emerging time period T , the secret key will
be packaged, split into multiple fragments and routed among the nodes in the DHT. Each
fragment, after being stored by a node in the DHT for a limited time period (shown as ‘hold’
in Figure 3), will be sent to the next node and gets routed towards the recipient along a
carefully designed path. At the release time tr, the recipient can collect the fragments from
the DHT network to recover the secret key (shown as ‘recover’). The recipient can then
download the encrypted/perturbed data from the storage cloud and recover the original
data using the obtained key. It is easy to see that the DHT network takes the core role in
the system. Next, we analyze the challenges and attacks that lead to the compromise of the
hidden secret key in the DHT network.
3.1.2 Adversary models
Based on the objective of the adversary, we define two attack models, namely the release-
ahead attack aiming to extract the key from DHT network before the release time tr and
the drop attack aiming to prevent the key from being recovered by the legitimate recipient
after tr. For both the attack models, the adversary needs to control a fraction of DHT
nodes which can be realized through Sybil attack [48], Eclipse attack [116] or collusion with
other adversaries. We divide the entire DHT nodes into two categories, namely honest nodes
always following the designed protocol as expected and malicious nodes controlled by the
adversaries. Specifically, we use p to denote the fraction of DHT nodes in the network
controlled by all the adversaries and we assume these adversaries can collude without any
restriction. In other words, we can imagine a single adversary that owns all the malicious
nodes in the network to launch either release ahead attack or drop attack.
In release ahead attack, the adversary, who may be the legitimate recipient, aims to
extract the secret key from the DHT network to recover the original private data before the
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release time tr. The adversary can collect the fragments of the key from controlled DHT
nodes (i.e., malicious nodes) if the packages were ever stored at any malicious node. This
type of attack is effective in many scenarios that require timed release of self-emerging data.
For instance, in an online exam scenario, if the adversary can obtain the exam questions
before other participants, he can gain more time to answer the questions and affect the
fairness of the exam.
In drop attack, the adversary aims to prevent the secret key from being received by the
legitimate recipient to recover the private data at release time tr. That is, if any malicious
node receives a fragment of the secret key before release time, the malicious node can refuse
following the designed protocol to further route that fragment to the recipient. A successful
drop attack can make the encrypted/perturbed data become inaccessible even after the
release time tr. In those time-sensitive scenarios, this means the scheduled activity has to be
canceled. For example, the online exam cannot be started. In addition, since the key is lost,
unless the adversary releases those dropped fragments again, the private data can never be
recovered.
3.1.3 Churn impact
The data storage in DHT networks always suffers from the churn issue [120], namely the
phenomenon that nodes frequently join and leave the network. The churn impact to our
system can be summarized as short-term and long-term impacts. The short-term impact is
caused by the transiently left nodes. The nodes leave the network for a short time period,
so their ID and responsibilities have not been transferred to other nodes. This may block
the routing of fragments of secret key in the network for a short time period but its effect
is limited. However, the long-term impact is vital to our system. A node is ‘dead’ when it
leaves the network for a long time and its ID and responsibility in the secret key routing is
deprived. Because of the death of the nodes, the fragments of the secret key stored by these
nodes are also lost. Even if the fragments are replicated to other nodes, we note that the
new nodes also have probability p (the fraction of nodes controlled by the adversary) to be
malicious, thus significantly increasing the chance of the adversaries to obtain the fragments
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and recover the secret key. For example, in the case that a fragment is replicated to three
nodes and two of them are dead and then replaced by new nodes during the emerging time
period T , the probability for the adversary to get the fragment increases from 1 − (1 − p)3
to 1− (1− p)5. Therefore, the conventional replication [126] is not adopted.
Motivated by these challenges, we propose the self-emerging data release protocols for
the DHT network to carefully package and route the fragments of secret key during the
emerging time period T to handle both the attack and churn.
3.2 SELF-EMERGING DATA RELEASE PROTOCOLS
In this section, we present the proposed self-emerging data release protocols in detail. The
protocols consist of three components, namely routing path construction, initial package
generation and package routing, to be implemented in a sequential order. Specifically, at
start time ts, the sender enters DHT network as a node. It first locally determines routing
path pattern based on the adopted pattern construction scheme and pseudo-randomly select
DHT IDs to fill in the pattern. Then, based on the pattern and selected IDs, the sender
node locally generates the initial data packages. Finally, it sends the initial packages out
and the packages will be routed and processed along the paths to deliver the secret key to
the recipient at the release time tr.
Based on the adopted routing path construction schemes, we propose three protocols
and all of them are based on the erasure coding mechanism [126]. As a common mechanism
to protect data, erasure coding [126] can divide a data package to m fragments and re-
code them into n fragments so that the package can be recovered from any m fragments
(m ≤ n). We start from the one-hop path pattern scheme, which applies erasure coding to
establish multiple one-hope paths between sender and recipient to guarantee attack resilience.
Then, by taking dead nodes (churn) into account, we propose the adjusted one-hop path
pattern scheme to make it resilient to churn issues by estimating the number of dead nodes
and adjusting the parameters of erasure coding based on the estimation. After that, by
dividing the entire emerging time period T = ts − tr into several shorter time periods,
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we propose the multi-hop path pattern scheme to iteratively implement the erasure coding
mechanism to route the fragments of secret key so that the loss of fragments during each
shorter time period can be suppressed and the lost fragments can be recovered by multiple
usages of erasure coding. To compare the schemes in terms of attack resilience, we measure
the release-ahead attack resilience, Rr as the probability that an adversary fails to restore
the secret key before the legitimate release time tr, and drop attack resilience, Rd as the
probability that an adversary fails to prevent the secret key from being restored by the
recipient at the release time tr. Specifically, we desire Rr = Rd because we expect that
the proposed protocol has both good release-ahead attack resilience and good drop attack
resilience without compromising either of them and making the protocol vulnerable. Next,
we present details of the three protocols in turn.
3.2.1 One-hop scheme
The one-hop path pattern scheme applies the erasure coding to split the secret key into n
fragments and send each of them through a one-hop path to the recipient to allow at most
n−m of the fragment transmissions to be unsuccessful. In other words, n holder nodes are
applied to store the n fragments for the entire emerging time period T . We name all the
nodes selected by the sender to form the path pattern as holder nodes. Each holder node
receives fragment(s) from its predecessor(s), holds(stores) the fragments for a time period (in
this scheme the entire emerging time period T ) and sends the fragments to its successor(s)
after that time period.
Routing path construction: To construct the one-hop path pattern, we need to determine
the total number of fragments, n and the minimum (threshold) number of fragments to
restore the secret key, m. Given the maximum available nodes that can be used to form the
pattern (namely the limited recourse), N , we can calculate the value of n and m to maximize
the attack resilience through Algorithm 1.
If an adversary controls at least m holder nodes, the secret key will be directly restored
at start time and the release-ahead attack is successful. If the adversary controls at least
n − m + 1 holder nodes, the recipient will fail to receive at least m fragments to restore
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Algorithm 1: One-hop path pattern
Input : Maximum available node number N .
Output: Total fragment number n, threshold fragment number m.
1 m = bN+12 c;
2 n = 2m− 1;
the secret key at release time tr, which makes drop attack successful. Therefore, by setting
n −m + 1 = m, namely n = 2m − 1, we get equivalent release-ahead attack resilience Rr
and drop attack resilience Rd.
Lemma 1. In one-hop scheme, with Rr = Rd, a larger n makes attack resilience Rr and Rd
higher.
Proof. From [110], we can get:
n
m
= (
σ
√
p(1−p)
m
+
√
σ2p(1−p)
m
+ 4(1− p)
2(1− p) )
2 (3.1)
where p denotes the probability that a random DHT node is malicious and σ is positively
proportional to Rd. To get Rr = Rd so that the system has good attack resilience towards
both the two attack models, we need n = 2m − 1, namely n
m
= 2m−1
m
≈ 2. Therefore, in
equation 3.1, with fixed value of n
m
and p, a larger m makes σ larger and therefore Rd higher.
Since n ≈ 2m and Rr = Rd, we can conclude that larger n makes Rr and Rd higher.
Therefore, given the limited available nodes N to form the pattern, we need to maximize
n to maximize the attack resilience, so we set m = bN+1
2
c (line 1) to maximize m as an
integer and then get n = 2m− 1 (line 2).
Initial package generation: The sender generates n initial data packages as the n frag-
ments of secret key.
Package routing: At start time ts, the sender node sends the n fragments to the n holder
nodes. The n holder nodes hold the fragments for the entire emerging time period T . At
the release time tr = ts + T , the holder nodes send the fragments to the recipient node.
Security analysis: The release-ahead attack resilience is Rr = 1−
∑n
i=m
(
n
i
)
pi(1−p)n−i and
drop attack resilience is Rd = 1−
∑n
i=n−m+1
(
n
i
)
pi(1− p)n−i, as the success rate of both the
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Figure 4: One-hop scheme Figure 5: Adjusted one-hop scheme
attack models follows binomial distribution. In the example shown in Figure 4 with n = 5
and m = 3, two holder nodes are malicious. In release-ahead attack, the two malicious holder
nodes can get two fragments, which is less than m to restore the encryption key package. In
the drop attack, the two malicious holder nodes can drop two fragments, but the recipient
can still get 3 (i.e., m) fragments to restore the encryption key package at release time tr.
In this simple one-hop scheme, the impact of churn is not taken into account. Next, to
handle the churn issues, we propose an adjusted one-hop scheme.
3.2.2 Adjusted one-hop scheme
If the emerging time period T becomes longer, more holder nodes may become dead due to
churn, which makes their stored fragments get lost. We can approach this problem in two
ways. The first solution is to generate a new fragment whenever one existing fragment is
lost. However, to generate the new fragment, at least m living fragments have to be collected
by one DHT node to restore the secret key and re-generate the n fragments through erasure
coding. This means the secret key has to be known by one node, which significantly increases
the success rate of release-ahead attack because this node has probability p to be malicious.
Therefore, we decide to take the second solution, namely estimating the number of dead
holder nodes as d and reserve some fragments at the beginning for these estimated dead
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holder nodes by adjusting m and n.
Algorithm 2: Adjusted one-hop path pattern
Input : Maximum available node number N , emerging time period T .
Output: Total fragment number n, threshold fragment number m.
1 n = N ;
2 pdead = 1− e− 1λT ;
3 d = pdead ∗ n;
4 for m = 1 to n do
5 Dif = |∑ni=m (ni)pi(1− p)n−i −∑n−di=n−d−m+1 (n−di )pi(1− p)n−d−i|
6 end
7 m = the value between 1 and n that minimizes Dif .
Routing path construction: As suggested by [23], the node death in DHT network can
be expressed by a decay pattern, namely the exponential distribution. We can then estimate
the percentage of dead holder nodes after the emerging time period T to be pdead = 1−e− 1λT ,
where λ is the average DHT node lifetime. (In [23], λ is set to 3 years, but it can be changed
for different DHT networks.) Therefore, among the n total holder nodes, the number of dead
holder nodes should be d = pdead ∗ n, which makes the number of living holder nodes to be
n−d. To do drop attack, the adversary should drop at least n−d−m+ 1 fragments among
the n− d living fragments to make the recipient can at most obtain m− 1 fragments at the
release time tr and therefore failing to recover the secret key. The probability of this, which
follows the binomial distribution, can be calculated by Pd =
∑n−d
i=n−d−m+1
(
n−d
i
)
pi(1−p)n−d−i.
However, the dead nodes have no influence on the release-ahead attack because the adversary
can collect the fragments at the beginning of the process before any node death. The
probability for the adversary to collect at least m fragments from the total n fragments
to restore the encryption key package is Pr =
∑n
i=m
(
n
i
)
pi(1 − p)n−i. Given the maximum
available nodes N and emerging time period T , we can calculate m and n through Algorithm
2. We first set n = N (line 1) to maximize attack resilience(the proof is similar to that of
lemma 1), and then estimate the number of dead nodes (line 2-3). After that, we try to find
the value of m between 1 and n to make Pd = Pr so that Rd = Rr (line 4-7).
Initial package generation: We use the same approach as the one-hope scheme.
Package routing: We use the same approach as the one-hope scheme.
Security analysis: In the example shown in Figure 5, we have the number of maximum
available nodes N = 6 and an estimated pdead =
1
6
. Therefore, we can calculate n = N = 6,
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Figure 6: Multi-hop scheme
d = 1 and m = 3 from Algorithm 2. If there are two malicious holder nodes and one
dead holder nodes after the emerging time period T , the adversary will fail to restore the
encryption key package with 2 < m obtained fragments and the recipient can successfully
recover the encryption key package with 3 = m received fragments.
Although the adjusted one-hop scheme is resilient to both attack resilience and churn,
it has two security problems when the emerging time period T is large. To better express
T in time scale, we represent T to be α times of average DHT node lifetime, λ. We believe
this is reasonable because different DHT networks may have different average DHT node
lifetime. First, when emerging time period T is large, the percentage (pdead) of nodes to
be dead may be quite large. For example, if we set pdead = 0.99 = 1 − e− 1λT , we can get
α = 4.6, which means 99% fragments will be lost due to churn after 4.6 times of average DHT
node lifetime, λ. In such cases, the adjusted one-hop scheme fails to make attack resilience
high. Another issue in this context is the error of estimating the number of dead nodes. An
implicit assumption for the adjusted one-hop scheme to be successful is the high accuracy
of the estimation result. Unfortunately, in practice, the real number of dead nodes does
not always match with the estimation and the estimation error becomes larger for longer
emerging time period T . To handle these two issues, we propose the multi-hop scheme.
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Algorithm 3: Multi-hop path pattern
Input : Maximum available node number N , emerging time period T , DHT node average
lifetime λ.
Output: Total fragment number n, threshold fragment number m, number of groups of n
holder nodes l.
1 for l = 1 to b5(Tλ + 1)2lgN−3c do
2 n = bNl c;
3 pdead = 1− e− Tλl ;
4 d = pdead ∗ n;
5 for m = 1 to n do
6 Dif = |∑ni=m (ni)pi(1− p)n−i −∑n−di=n−d−m+1 (n−di )pi(1− p)n−d−i|
7 end
8 m = the value between 1 and n that minimizes Dif ;
9 Rr = (1−
∑n
i=m
(
n
i
)
pi(1− p)n−i)l;
10 Rd = (1−
∑n−d
i=n−d−m+1
(
n−d
i
)
pi(1− p)n−d−i)l;
11 end
12 The selected (l, n,m) maximizes min(Rr, Rd).
3.2.3 Multi-hop scheme
Instead of leveraging a single set of nodes (Figure 5) to hold the fragments during the entire
T , we now arrange multiple sets of nodes (Figure 6) to carry the fragments in relay from
the sender to the recipient. Also, the single usage of the erasure coding is now extended to
a nested usage so that the old fragments can be merged at each set of nodes to generate
new fragments and the reduced number of alive fragments can be replenished during each
re-generation. Specifically, we divide the entire long emerging time period T to l pieces of
short time periods, namely T = l ∗ 4T . To form the path pattern, we need l sets of nodes
to carry the fragments in relay and each set to take charge of the fragments for 4T , namely
(i − 1)4T ≤ t < i4T , where i ∈ [1, l]. Each set contains n nodes, so the entire number
of nodes to form the path pattern is n ∗ l, which should be pseudo-randomly selected by
the sender node in a non-repeated way. At the start of the ith short time period, namely
the time t = (i − 1)4T , each node in the ith set receives one fragment from each node in
the (i − 1)th set. Ideally, the number of received fragments should be n. However, some
fragments may be lost due to drop attack (the (i − 1)th set has malicious nodes) or churn
(some nodes in the (i− 1)th set become dead during the (i− 1)th short time period). If the
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number of received fragments is at least m, the node in the ith set can still successfully merge
the received fragments to get the one generating them through erasure coding (called parent
fragment). This parent fragment consists of the n new fragments and the IDs of the nodes
in the (i+ 1)th group. At the end of the ith short time period, namely the time t = i4T , the
n new fragments are sent to the n nodes in the (i + 1)th group. The whole process is then
repeated during the next short time period 4T . This routing scheme has two advantages.
First, since 4T < T , the lost fragments during 4T is much fewer than the lost ones during
T . Second, by iteratively implementing erasure coding, each group of n nodes can recover
the lost fragments caused by drop attack or churn during the previous short time period.
Routing path construction: Besides the values of m and n for erasure coding, the multi-
hop scheme also needs to decide the value of l, namely the number of short time period
4T = T
l
, also as the number of sets of nodes. The multi-hop path pattern algorithm
is shown as Algorithm 3. Assume we have determined l, since the number of maximum
available nodes is N = n ∗ l, we can get n = bN
l
c (line 2). Then, we estimate the dead
nodes d during the short time period 4 = T
l
(line 3-4) and find the value for m (line 5-
8, same as Algorithm 2). We can then calculate the attack resilience Rr and Rd for each
value of l. Our objective is to find the value of l that maximize min(Rr, Rd) from the range
[1 , b5(T
λ
+ 1)2lgN−3c], where the upper bound of the range is estimated through simulation
that will be presented in Section 3.3.
Initial package generation: The sender node should first run algorithm 3 to determine
l, n,m and pseudo-randomly choose non-repeated IDs for the selected nodes. After that, the
sender node can pretend to be the recipient node that has recovered the secret key. Then,
the sender node can split the secret key into n fragments through erasure coding and assume
these n fragments are the parent fragments maintained by the nodes in the last set (lth
set), called lth parent fragments. Next, the sender node should split each of the lth parent
fragments into another n fragments received by the node in the 1st set from the n nodes
in the (l − 1)th set. At this stage, the sender node should have n2 fragments because there
are n nodes in the (l − 1)th set and each of them sends n fragments to the lth set of nodes
(as shown in Figure 6). The n fragments for each node in the (l − 1)th set can be merged
to generate the parent fragment maintained by it so that the sender only need to keep the
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(l − 1)th parent fragments to save space. By repeating this procedure, the sender node can
get the (l − 2)th parent fragments, (l − 3)th parent fragments... and finally the 1st parent
fragments maintained by the 1st set of nodes, which are actually the initial packages sent
from the sender node to them.
Package routing: Figure 6 shows an example of multi-hop scheme with l = 3 and n = 3.
At start time ts, the sender node sends three initial packages to the three 1
st group nodes.
Each 1st group node gets three contained fragments from the initial package, stores them
for a short time period 4T and send the three fragments to the three 2nd group nodes at
t1 = ts + 4T . Then, each 2nd group node restores a parent fragment from the received
fragments, gets three contained fragments, holds them for 4T and sends them to the three
3rd group nodes at t2 = ts + 24T . Finally, each 3rd group node restores a package from
the received fragments, gets the secret key fragment, holds it for 4T and sends it to the
recipient node at tr to make the recipient restore the secret key.
Security analysis: The multi-hop scheme has better performance when the emerging time
T is large. When the Algorithm 3 gives l = 1, the output pattern is same as the one generated
by the adjusted one-hop scheme. Therefore, we can consider the adjusted one-hop scheme
to be a special case of the multiple-hop scheme.
Next, we evaluate the proposed protocols through experimental evaluation.
3.3 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we experimentally evaluate the performance and security offered by the
proposed protocols. Before reporting our results, we first present our experimental setup.
3.3.1 Experimental setup
We use an Intel Core i7 PC with 16GB RAM to simulate the protocols through the Java-based
DHT toolkit Overlay Weaver. We invoke at most 10000 DHT node instances and repeat
each experiment for 1000 times to show the average results. To evaluate the attack resilience,
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Figure 7: Varying emerging time period T
we mark a DHT node as malicious with probability p. To evaluate the churn resilience, we
set a lifetime for each DHT node, which follows exponential distribution suggested by [23].
3.3.2 Experimental results
In our experiments, we first evaluate the impact of varying emerging time period T to the
performance and security of the three protocols with one-hop scheme (one-hop), adjusted
one-hop scheme (adjusted) and multi-hop scheme (multi-hop) respectively. Then, we evalu-
ate the impact of the maximum available nodes N , namely the limited resource to construct
the path pattern, to the protocols. Finally, we discuss the selection of the upper bound of l
range in Algorithm 3.
The first set of experiments evaluates the protocols with varying emerging time period
T . The objective of the protocols is to hold and hide the secret key in the DHT network for
the emerging time period T . Therefore, the value of T is an important factor to evaluate it.
If the protocol can only effectively work for short T , we do not find its performance to be
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good enough to satisfy long emerging times. A longer emerging time period T may result in
more dead nodes, which requires the protocol to be both churn-resilient and attack-resilient.
To comprehensively understand the performance of the protocols, we measure their attack
resilience with four representative value of T , namely short emerging time period T = 0.1λ,
medium emerging time period T = λ, long emerging time period T = 10λ and very long
time period T = 100λ, where λ denotes the average lifetime of DHT nodes (e.g. three
years in [23]). Since we equally treat the release ahead attack resilience Rr and drop attack
resilience Rd, the measured R = Rr = Rd. The maximum available nodes N is fixed to 10000.
In Figure 7(a), we measure attack resilience R with varying p for the short emerging time
period T = 0.1λ. All the three protocols show good R. Even the protocol based on one-hop
scheme, which is most susceptible to T , can maintain quite high R when p ≤ 0.44. However,
even for short T with little churn impact, we can see the performance of the multi-hop scheme
is the best. In Figure 7(b), the emerging time period is 10 times than the previous one, which
makes the churn impact start to be strong. For the one-hop and adjusted one-hop schemes,
since pdead = 1− e−1 = 0.63, 63% of the n fragments has been lost due to churn. As can be
seen, since the one-hop scheme does not adjust n and m for this, its R directly drops to 0.
In contrast, the adjusted one-hop scheme adjusts the value of m by estimating the number
of dead nodes and its R is still good before p = 0.26. Compared with these two schemes, the
performance of the multi-hop scheme is much better. The reason for that is the partitioning
of the entire emerging time period T . By dividing it into multiple small pieces, the number
of dead nodes during each small time period can be reduced and the lost fragments can also
be recovered by the iterative erasure coding. In Figure 7(c), the emerging time period T is
further increased by 10 times. Such a long T makes nearly 100% nodes to be dead for the
two one-hop schemes and results in their R = 0. In contrast, although the multi-hop scheme
is also affected, it still keeps R > 0.99 when p ≤ 0.32. Finally, even for the very long T in
Figure 7(d), the multi-hop scheme can still maintain R > 0.99 when p ≤ 0.14. As can be
seen, all the three schemes work well for short T . The adjusted one-hop scheme can keep
good performance for medium T , but only the multi-hop scheme can work well even for long
and very long T .
The second set of experiments evaluates protocols with maximum total available node
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Figure 8: Varying path construction resource N
N to build the path pattern, namely the path construction resource. Our default choice
of N is 10000, which means the routing path pattern is constructed by 10000 DHT nodes.
This is acceptable for large-scale DHT network. However, in practice, if a DHT network
is not big enough to support N = 10000, we want to understand the impact of reduced
N to the performance of protocols by reducing N to 5000, 1000, and 100. For this set of
experiments, we set the emerging time period T = 2λ, which has made the attack resilience
of the one-hop attack drop to 0 even for N = 10000, so we mainly focus on the performance
of adjusted one-hop scheme and multi-hop scheme. In Figure 8(a), N is reduced to 100,
which means the routing path pattern is formed by at most 100 DHT nodes. We can find
that the attack resilience R of one-hop scheme rapidly drops from 0.866 for p = 0.02 to 0.422
for p = 0.12. In contrast, the attack resilience R of multi-hop scheme keeps higher than 0.99
before p = 0.14 and drops lower than 0.5 when p is around 0.29. We can conclude that the
multi-hop scheme can still effectively work for small path pattern with N = 100 when the
probability of node to be malicious p is not high but the adjusted one-hop scheme does not
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work well. In Figure 8(b), we increase N by 10 times. Both the two schemes have improved
attack resilience. Specifically, the adjusted one-hop scheme can make R > 0.9 for p < 0.08
and R > 0.5 for p < 0.13, and the multi-hop scheme can make R > 0.99 for p < 0.30 and
R > 0.5 for p < 0.38. Then, we further increase N by 5 times to 5000 in Figure 8(c). The
adjusted one-hop scheme can make R > 0.9 for p < 0.10 and R > 0.5 for p < 0.12, and
the multi-hop scheme can make R > 0.99 for p < 0.38 and R > 0.5 for p < 0.42. We find
that the reduction way of the attack resilience R of the adjusted one-hop scheme along the
increasing p changes from a smooth manner to a steep manner from N = 1000 to N = 5000.
We can consider p = 0.12 as the threshold. When N is small, the R value for p < 0.12
gradually drops from 1 to 0.5 and the R for p > 0.12 gradually drops from 0.5 to 0. In
contrast, when N is large, the R keeps close to 1 for p < 0.12 and suddenly drops to almost
0 after p = 0.12. In Figure 8(d), the attack resilience of adjusted one-hop scheme has little
change. The multi-hop scheme slightly increases R > 0.99 for p < 0.40. As can be seen, the
value of N can be reduced to 5000 from 10000 without losing big performance.
The goal of the third set of experiments is to reasonably bound the selection of l in the
Algorithm 3 because we have proved the multi-hop scheme is the most effective one and the
unnecessary loops in l selection can drop the performance of Algorithm 3. In Figure 9(a), we
fix T = 2λ and measure value of l with varying p for N = 100, 1000, 10000. We can see that
the upper bound of l happens at large p and changes from 12 to 26 to 41 for N = 102, 103, 104
respectively so that we can roughly summarize the increment to be twice when N increases
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from 10i to 10i+1. In Figure 9(b), we fix N = 10000 and measure value of l with varying p
for T = 0.1λ, λ, 10λ, 100λ. We can find the upper bound of l also happens at large p and can
be bounded by 10T
λ
+ 10. We can then combine the finding from the two figures to conclude
that (10T
λ
+ 10) ∗ 2 lgNlg 10000 = (5T
λ
+ 5) ∗ 2lgN−3.
3.4 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In this chapter, we propose the design of a decentralized self-emerging data release system
using large-scale Distributed Hash Table (DHT) networks as the underlying infrastructure.
The proposed schemes allow the data sender to securely hide the secret keys of the private
data stored in clouds such that the data becomes available at the defined release time but
remains unavailable prior to the release time. We present a suite of routing path construc-
tion schemes for securely storing and routing secret key in DHT networks that prevent an
adversary from inferring the secret key prior to the release time (release-ahead attack) or
from destroying the key altogether (drop attack). Our experimental evaluation using Overlay
Weaver DHT emulator toolkit demonstrates that the proposed schemes are resilient to both
release-ahead attack and drop attack as well as to attacks that arise due to traditional churn
issues in DHT networks.
Due to the design objectives of the DHT protocols, it is hard to enforce behaviors per-
formed by DHT nodes to make the nodes honestly perform desired behaviors, so the DHT-
based decentralized self-emerging data release system proposed in this chapter mainly relies
on the redundancy and recovery mechanisms to make the system resist against attacks and
churn, which usually requires complex routing paths composed of hundreds of DHT nodes.
In the next chapter, we examine another P2P network infrastructure of designing decentral-
ized self-emerging data release systems, which leverages the decentralized consensus and the
native cryptocurrency of blockchains to enhance protocol enforceability, thus reducing the
number of nodes required for safely routing the self-emerging data.
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4.0 SELF-EMERGING DATA RELEASE USING ETHEREUM
BLOCKCHAIN NETWORK
In this chapter, we study the ways of designing a self-emerging data release system using
the Ethereum blockchain network [128]. Our research in this chapter corresponds to the
research task T-2. Before presenting the details, it is important to first explain the key
research questions of accomplishing this research task when the underlying P2P network
infrastructure has been changed from a DHT infrastructure to a blockchain infrastructure.
Research goals: Similar to the design objectives in Chapter 3, the goal of the system
designed in this chapter is to keep the private data protected until a prescribed data release
time and get automatically released to the legitimate recipient at the release time, even if
the data sender goes oﬄine. However, as we have discussed in section 1.1, unlike a recipient
in DHT networks that simply implies a DHT node, a recipient of self-emerging data in
a blockchain network, such as Ethereum, may imply two types of accounts, namely an
External Owned Account (EOA) controlled by a peer of the blockchain network through a
private/public key pair or a Contract Account (CA) controlled by a smart contract. Due
to the different properties associated with the two types of recipients, such as the abilities
of actively participating in the protocol or locally storing data, the underlying protocols
designed for the self-emerging data release system may also become different. Therefore, it
is important to emphasize that our study in this chapter focuses on the scenario that both
the data sender and recipient of the self-emerging data are EOA accounts. In other words,
self-emerging data is released to peers controlling EOA accounts. In the rest of this chapter,
for ease of presentation, we denote the data sender and recipient as S and R while the rest
of EOA accounts as P s representing peers in the Ethereum network. The details of releasing
self-emerging data to CA accounts, which could support privacy-preserving timed execution
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of functions in smart contracts, will be presented in the next chapter.
Properties of peers in Ethereum: A peer in Ethereum can create EOA accounts to
interact with the blockchain and other peers. Similar to a peer running DHT nodes, a peer
in Ethereum also has the ability of storing data locally and communicating with other nodes
privately and can freely join and leave the network. Specifically, two peers in Ethereum can
establish a private channel through the Whisper protocol [13], where a sender encrypts a mes-
sage with recipient’s public key and a recipient decrypts the message with the corresponding
private key.
Adversary models: Instead of following the assumption made in Chapter 3 that the peers
(i.e., DHT nodes or EOA accounts) are either honest or malicious, the unique feature of
blockchains produced by the blending of smart contracts and cryptocurrency allows us to
assume that all the peers in Ethereum are adversaries with rationality. In DHT, due to the
lack of trust among nodes, there is no way that one node can enforce another node to do
anything. However, in Ethereum blockchain, since the decentralized trust has been estab-
lished through blockchain, each smart contract can be considered as a (virtual) trusted third
party. Then, by asking each participant of a smart contract to deposit a certain amount of
cryptocurrency as the security deposit to the contract, any fraudulent or dishonest behavior
that violates the agreements recorded in the contract will make the violator be monetarily
penalized, which incentivizes all rational participants to honestly follow the contract. In
this chapter, we leverage such financial incentive and penalty to revisit the countermeasures
against undesirable misbehaviors of service providers.
Technical approaches: Our smart contract implementation recruits a set of Ethereum
peers to jointly follow the proposed self-emerging data release service protocol allowing the
participating peers to earn the remuneration paid by the service users. Meanwhile, the re-
cruited peers need to pay security deposits so that any detected misbehaviors can result in
the deposits being confiscated. We model the problem as an extensive-form game with imper-
fect information to protect against post-facto attacks including drop attack and release-ahead
attack. Through careful design of the smart contract based on game theory, we demonstrate
that the best choice of any rational Ethereum peer in the proposed technique is to always
honestly follow the correct protocol.
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Figure 10: Blockchain-based decentralized self-emerging data release system
Evaluation: We validate the efficacy and attack-resilience of the proposed techniques
through rigorous analysis and experimental evaluation on the Ethereum official test network.
The experiments demonstrate the low monetary cost and the low time overhead associated
with the proposed approach and validate its guaranteed security properties.
In the rest of this chapter, we first introduce the self-emerging data release system es-
tablished over the blockchain infrastructure in section 4.1. Then, in section 4.2, we present
the self-emerging data release service protocol in detail. In section 4.3, we implement and
evaluate the proposed protocol on the Ethereum official test network. Finally, we summarize
this chapter in section 4.4.
4.1 SYSTEM OVERVIEW
In this section, we present an overview of the proposed self-emerging data release system
using the blockchain infrastructure and we introduce the key ideas behind the proposed
self-emerging data release service protocol.
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4.1.1 Self-emerging data release system using Ethereum blockchain infrastruc-
ture
The proposed blockchain-based decentralized self-emerging data release system consists of
four key entities (Figure 10) namely data senders, data receivers, a cloud storage and the
blockchain infrastructure enabling the self-emerging data release service.
Data sender (S): Data senders have private data to be released to data recipients at a
future point in time. At setup time ts, a data sender encrypts/perturbs the private data
using a secret key, sends the encrypted/perturbed private data to a cloud storage system
and sends the encrypted secret key into the blockchain infrastructure for timed release at
the expected release time.
Data recipient (R): Data recipients receive the private data at the expected data release
time. While the encrypted/perturbed private data can be downloaded from the cloud stor-
age at any time, the secret key from the blockchain infrastructure can be released to data
recipients only at the release time tr determined by data senders.
Cloud: A cloud storage is used as a medium for data senders to transfer the encrypted/per-
turbed private data to data recipients.
Blockchain infrastructure: The blockchain infrastructure forms the core component of
the self-emerging data release system. It implements the protocols necessary for offering
self-emerging data release services to data senders.
4.1.2 Self-emerging data release service protocol
The proposed timed data release protocol implemented on the blockchain peer-to-peer net-
work splits a long storage time duration into a series of successive shorter time durations,
each of which is handled by a different peer on the blockchain network as the encrypted
secret key gets routed on the blockchain network from time ts to tr. Thus, the encrypted
secret key is routed from the sender to recipient through a routing path formed by multiple
peers of the network, each of which stores the encrypted key for a short time window. In
the example shown in Figure 10, the storage time duration [ts, tr] is split into three fractions
and the encrypted secret key is passed from sender S to recipient R through a routing path
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formed by peers P1, P2 and P3. The proposed protocol enables such a routing scheme through
onion routing [46] that requires the sender to first encrypt the secret key using the public
key of the recipient and then iteratively form layers of encryption using the public keys of
the selected peers on the routing path. As a result, each peer on the routing path decrypts
one layer of the encryption of the secret key using their private keys before forwarding it to
the subsequent peers on the path until it reaches the recipient who decrypts the final layer
of the encryption to obtain the key in plain text.
The protocol provides incentive to the participating peers by requiring the data senders
to pay remunerations to the peers for obtaining the store and forward services from them
to route the encrypted key along. To participate in the contract, the protocol requires the
peers to pay security deposits so that any misbehaviors detected in the protocol will result
in their deposits being confiscated.
The protocol satisfies two key requirements in order to be effective in practice:
• First, it ensures credibility so that senders, recipients and peers are guaranteed that they
all see the same protocol when they participate in the service. We implement the service
protocol using the Ethereum smart contract platform [128] which ensures that when smart
contracts get deployed into the blockchain infrastructure, the protocol can be recorded in
the blockchain and be available to the public and becomes nearly tamper-proof unless
someone controls a majority of computation power of the distributed network [4].
• Second, the protocol needs to be enforceable so that peers are guaranteed to receive re-
munerations for honestly performing the agreed services while being penalized for any
misbehavior or failure to render the promised service. The terms and conditions of the
protocol implemented as determinate logics in our approach pass the ownership of money
to the smart contract such that it ensures that the only way to receive payment from the
smart contract is to trigger the contract with a satisfied condition dictated in the protocol.
The proposed protocol consists of four key components. We introduce them briefly here
and present their detailed design in section 4.2.
Peer registration: At any point in time, a new peer P can register by paying a security
deposit to join a contract by adding into the registration list maintained by the contract.
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This process makes the entire network learn that the peer has registered and can provide
services during its prescribed working times. For example, in Figure 10, we find that P1, P2
and P3 have been registered before the setup time ts.
Service setup: At any point in time, a sender S can pay remunerations and submit peers
selected from the registration list to a contract C and set up a self-emerging data release
service. This process makes the service to be recorded by a service list maintained by the
contract, C. In Figure 10, we find that sender S requests a service at ts with selected peers
P1, P2 and P3.
Service enforcement: After a service has been set up, the participants, namely sender
S, recipient R and peers, P s should follow the protocol honestly in order to render the
service successfully. Behaviors violating the protocol will lead to service failure and such
misbehaviors are detected and penalized by the contract. In Figure 10, the process of routing
the encrypted secret key from S to R through the path formed by the three peers is enforced
by the contract C through paying remunerations for honest behaviors while confiscating
deposits for misbehaviors detected by C.
Reporting mechanism: To effectively detect misbehaviors in the protocol implemented
in the smart contract, the reporting mechanism incentives peers to report misbehaviors by
announcing an award in the contract.
4.1.3 Attack models
In this chapter, we model adversaries with rationality and consider two key post-facto attack
models, namely drop attack and release-ahead attack.
Rational adversaries: Recently, it has been widely recognized that assuming an adversary
to be semi-honest or malicious is either too weak or too strong in many practical cases
and hence modeling adversaries with rationality [47, 61, 62, 103] is a relevant choice in
several attack scenarios. Informally, a semi-honest adversary follows the prescribed protocol
but tries to glean more information from available intermediate results while a malicious
adversary can take any action for launching attacks [64, 133]. A rational adversary lies in
the middle of the two types. That is, rational adversaries are self-interest-driven, they choose
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to violate protocols, such as colluding with other parties, only when doing so brings them
a higher profit. In this chapter, in order to design our system with strong and practical
security guarantees, we model all involved participants, namely S, R and P , to be rational
adversaries without assuming any of them to be honest.
Post-facto attacks: The system targets post-facto attacks. That is, it defends the private
data against future attacks launched after the private data has been sent into the system.
By allowing senders to declare a registration deadline td earlier than ts and only select
peers registered before this deadline, adversaries who decide to attack Alice’s data after
observing the start of self-emergence of Alice’s data from the blockchain cannot make his
newly registered peer be selected. Therefore, the primary way to launch attacks is to bribe
the peers having Alice’s data.
Drop attack: A drop attack happens when the encrypted secret key fails to reach the
recipient R at release time tr. For example, in Figure 10, after receiving the encrypted secret
key from peer P2, peer P3 may decide to destroy it. A rational adversary may launch a drop
attack for getting profit. In post-facto attacks, drop attacks primarily occur through peer
bribery. As we have modeled both adversaries and collaborating peers, P to be rational, a
drop attack happens only when the adversary gets higher profit from the drop attack than
the paid bribery and when P receives higher bribery than the drop penalty. To break the
win-win situation, we carefully design the detection mechanism in section 4.2.3 to make drop
attacks detectable and to allow the reporting mechanism in section 4.2.4 to distinguish and
penalize the adversaries. In addition, by modeling the protocol as an extensive-form game
with imperfect information [79], we demonstrate that drop attack can be entirely prevented
in our rational model.
Release-ahead attack: In release-ahead attacks, an adversary aims to obtain the secret
key before the actual release time tr and earn a profit by utilizing the data prior to the release
time. In Figure 10, peer P3 can launch a release-ahead attack by releasing the encrypted
secret key to recipient R before tr. Similar to drop attacks, release-ahead attacks primarily
happen through peer bribery in post-facto attacks. However, unlike drop attacks that can
be detected, a release-ahead attack happens secretly as peers on the path can share stored
data to any party without leaving a mark. Our proposed techniques handle this challenge
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by designing a reporting mechanism to model the release-ahead attack as an extensive-form
game with imperfect information (section 4.2.4). It makes rational adversaries choose to
never launch release-ahead attacks as the game ensures that the best choice of any rational
Ethereum peer is to always honestly follow the correct protocol.
4.1.4 Assumptions
We make the following key assumptions in this chapter:
• We assume that the monetary value of the private data within a service request is bounded
by the highest deposit paid by the registered service providers, which represents the real-
time solvency of the system.
• Similar to Bitcoin [100], we assume that the pseudonymity offered by Ethereum to the
network peers is not adequate [93]. Although techniques such as mixing [29] have been
proposed, it is still unclear whether the identification of peers can be adequately pro-
tected in such large-scale P2P networks. Therefore, we assume that adversaries can freely
communicate with any Ethereum peers and we assume no protection of pseudonymity or
anonymity.
• We also assume that an adversary and the peers in communication do not trust each other
as otherwise their cost-free collusion violates the rationality assumption of all parties.
• Our system employs the Whisper protocol [13] to enable communication between two
Ethereum peers. We assume that a private channel generated using the Whisper protocol
between any two Ethereum peers is secure.
• Finally, we assume that the number of registered peers is adequate for providing the
required service. We assume that there are at least two different available registered peers
at any moment for each service request.
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4.2 SELF-EMERGING DATA RELEASE SERVICE PROTOCOL
In this section, we present the proposed service protocol organized along four subsections,
each of which discusses a key component of the protocol.
4.2.1 Peer registration
In this subsection, we present the first part of the protocol, peer registration, designed for
allowing peers to make themselves known to the network. After presenting the protocol in
Table 1, we discuss the peer working window and deposit management in more detail. To
set up self-emerging data release services, a prerequisite is to have a platform for making
peers P s and data senders Ss know each other. Since peers and senders have no trust in
each other, instead of a face-to-face negotiation, they need to transfer their information (peer
working window Tw and sender storage window T s) and money (remuneration and deposit)
to the decentralized smart contract C and treat C as a trusted intermediary to put the deal
through. A new peer registers by sending their working windows, public keys and deposit to
join the contract C. This information is recorded in the registration list maintained by C.
Peer working windows: As discussed in Section 4.1.2, the proposed service protocol splits
a long storage time duration, T s into a series of successive shorter time durations, each of
which is handled by a different peer during its working window, Tw, as the encrypted secret
key gets routed on the blockchain network. Figure 11 shows an example representing Tws
as horizontal segments in a coordinate frame with timeline and peer indexes as x and y axes
respectively. Here, the segment at the bottom-left corner represents a working window [t1, t2]
belonging to Pi.
Deposit management mechanism: The proposed protocol uses deposits as a mechanism
to penalize peer misbehaviors in order to prevent drop and release-ahead attacks. Senders
may want to pay more for getting a higher deposit from peers as guarantees of their behaviors
to send private data with higher monetary value v. To support such requirements, we design
a dynamic deposit management mechanism that incorporates deposit with two states: frozen
and unfrozen. One can imagine that each peer has a deposit account in contract C. The
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Table 1: Peer registration
Peer registration protocol
1. To be registered, each peer must submit a set of future working windows Tws and a
public key to contract C. It must also pay a deposit to contract C as assurance of no
misbehavior while providing future services.
2. Each peer agrees to complete any assigned jobs.
3. Each peer agrees to allow the contract to freeze a part of its deposit for an assigned job
until the job is completed.
4. Each peer agrees to renew the public key for each job.
5. Each peer can modify working windows Tws and the unfrozen deposit at any time, but
jobs assigned before modification should still be completed.
deposit account is opened after registration and its balance is denoted as da. Initially, da
is unfrozen. Later, data senders can calculate the amount of deposit they want from peers,
denoted as ds, based on the monetary value of the private data v. Then, during service setup,
senders should only select peers from the registration list with at least ds unfrozen deposit in
their accounts. The amount of ds deposit, once being verified by contract C, will be frozen
from accounts of selected peers until the end of their services. At any time, each peer can
only manage its unfrozen deposit in the account as the ownership of the unfrozen part has
been temporarily transferred to contract C. In this way, the designed deposit management
mechanism encourages peers with secure storage environment to keep a high deposit balance
so that they can get jobs requiring higher deposit ds to earn more payments by taking higher
risk.
4.2.2 Service setup
Next, we present the second part of the protocol, namely service setup, designed for allowing
senders to select peers from the registration list based on their requirements and set up the
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Table 2: Service setup
Service setup protocol
1. Before setup time ts, senders compute the remuneration r̂ and deposit d
s required by
this service and then locally run the peer selection algorithm to select peers from the
registration list satisfying their requirements.
2. At setup time ts, senders submit service information including selected peers to contract
C. Also, both sender S and recipient R should pay p > ds + r̂ to contract C.
3. Upon receiving a setup request, contract C calculates remuneration r̂ and deposit ds of
this service, then:
a. If p > ds + r̂ and each selected peer has unfrozen deposit higher than ds, C will
approve the setup, freeze ds of selected peers and refund p− ds − r̂ to S, p− ds to
R.
b. Otherwise, C will reject the setup and refund p to S, R.
service with contract C after paying remunerations. We first present the protocol description
for service setup in Table 2 and then illustrate the remuneration computation and peer
selection algorithm in detail.
Remuneration computation: The total remuneration r̂ paid by the sender consists of
two parts r̂c and r̂s. The r̂c component is charged to compensate the cost of peers for
invoking functions of contract C during the service, so r̂c = krc for k selected peers. The r̂s
component is charged to reward peers for storing the secret key, so it should be higher for
longer storage time |T s|. Meanwhile, to encourage more peers to serve for long-term storage,
senders should be charged more for a later storage hour closer to release time tr than an
earlier one closer to setup time ts. Therefore, if we represent the charge of i
th storage hour as
4ris and set the first hour charge as 4r1s , by setting per hour increment of 4ris as α, we get
4ris = 4ri−1s + α, which further gives r̂s = |T
s|[4r1s+4r1s+(|T s|−1)α]
2
= |T s|4r1s + |T
s|(|T s|−1)
2
α.
Additionally, S should be charged more for a higher monetary value of private data v as
an incentive to make peers maintain higher balance in deposit accounts, so we consider the
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above r̂c and r̂s as the charging standard when v = 4v (e.g., 4v = $100) and adjust the
final r̂ based on that. To sum up, a sender should pay remuneration r̂ = (d v4ve)β[krc +
|T s|4r1s + |T
s|(|T s|−1)
2
α] in total and a peer serving for ith to jth hours in T s should be paid
r = (d v4ve)β[rc + (j − i)4r1s + i+j−22 α], where α > 0 and β > 1.
Peer selection: The peer selection algorithm has two objectives, namely (i) minimizing
remunerations paid by senders and (ii) maximizing the expected profit made by the peers.
To realize the first objective, we note that the only way to reduce remuneration r̂ is to make
k smaller, namely selecting fewer peers for a service, which does not impact the expected
profit r earned by selected peers as r̂s is fixed. For achieving the second objective, we need
the algorithm to always pick earlier hours in peer working windows Tws first so that deposit
ds can be unfrozen as soon as possible. For example, the algorithm needs to pick just one
hour from a ten-hour Tw for a one-hour service. By picking the last hour in Tw, that peer
only receives a one-hour profit because deposit ds has to be frozen for the entire ten hours.
In contrast, by picking the first hour, since deposit ds will be unfrozen after one hour, the
door for accepting new jobs is reopened and that peer can make a ten-hour profit in the
best case. We design a greedy algorithm to achieve both of these objectives simultaneously.
By decomposing the peer selection problem into a series of subproblems, we define each
subproblem as ‘given all peer working windows Tws covering an input time point, output
the Tw that makes the total number of selected peers minimum’. Once a Tw is selected,
its beginning time tb is then used as the input time point of the subsequent subproblem to
select the next peer. Intuitively, in a subproblem, the greedy choice is to pick the Tw with
earliest tb. Therefore, we have:
Lemma 2. The greedy algorithm that always picks Tw with earliest tb minimizes the number
of selected P for a service.
Proof. Let us consider that the peer selection problem is decomposed into n rounds of con-
tinuous subproblems. If an algorithm falls behind the greedy algorithm in round i, then
the only way for this algorithm to catch up with the greedy algorithm at round i + 1 will
be to select the greedy choice of round i + 1 in round i + 1, but this can at most make its
performance same as the greedy algorithm.
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Figure 11: Peer selection
We demonstrate an example of the peer selection process in Figure 11. Instead of release
time tr, the algorithm takes tr + |Tt| as the input time point of the first-round subproblem
as we need to leave a short time period |Tt| for data transfer between each pair of adjacent
peers on path. Therefore, in the example with path S → P1 → P2 → P3 → R, we need
four |Tt|s. In the first round, there are three available peer working windows Tws covering
tr + |Tt| and obviously Tw3 , due to its earliest begin time tb among the three, is the greedy
choice. As a result, we select P3 as the last peer on path and set T
w3 .tb + |Ti| as input of the
second-round subproblem. We then get Tw2 as second-round greedy choice, so we select P2
and set Tw2 .tb + |Ti| as input of the third-round subproblem, which gives Tw1 as third-round
greedy choice to pick P1. This is the end of peer selection process as T
w1 has already covered
setup time.
The pseudo-code of the peer selection algorithm is shown in Algorithm 4 (we assume peers
have passed registration deadline check and balance check). The peer selection problem is
decomposed into a series of subproblems. For each subproblem (loop 2-15), the algorithm
traverses all available peer working windows Tws (loop 3-8) to find the ones satisfying the
conditions that: 1) it covers the input time point of this round (line 4); 2) it has earlier tb than
the ones that have been traversed (line 5); 3) the peer has not been selected for this service
(line 5). After an eligible Tw is found, the greedy choice for this round is updated (line 6).
Finally, the end of the traversal gives the greedy choice for the current round subproblem.
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Algorithm 4: Peer selection algorithm
Input : Registered peer working window set with enough unfrozen deposit T̂w, requested sender
storage window T s = [ts, tr], transfer time period |Tt|.
Output: Selected peer working window list T˜w.
1 Initialize tcur = tr, tpre = tr, T
w
sel;
2 while tpre > ts do
3 for each Tw ∈ T̂w do
4 if Tw.tb < tcur + |Tt| & Tw.te > tcur + |Tt| &
5 Tw.tb < tpre + |Tt| & nonRepeat(Tw) then
6 Twsel = T
w; tpre = T
w.tb;
7 end
8 end
9 if nonRepeat(Twsel) then
10 T˜w ← Twsel; tcur = tpre;
11 end
12 else
13 Fail;
14 end
15 end
If the greedy choice is different from that of the last round, the algorithm approves it and
starts the next round (line 9-11). Otherwise, the algorithm fails to find available P s for this
service and returns False. The complexity of this algorithm is O(|T̂w||T˜w|).
4.2.3 Service enforcement
The third component of the protocol deals with service enforcement that specifies the be-
haviors that should be followed by the sender S, recipient R and peers, P s during the service
process to render the service successful. The protocol sets deadlines for each behavior and
treats any missing behavior as a drop attack to enable drop attacks behavior to be detectable.
Next, we present the protocol in Table 3 with a discussion on the designed behaviors. We
then model the protocol as an extensive-form game with imperfect information to prove that
any rational participating peer will always follow the protocol honestly.
Whisper key submission: Our system employs the Whisper protocol [13] to transfer
secret keys between any two Ethereum peers by building private channels with symmetrical
whisper keys. Specifically, the first peer should encrypt its whisper key with the public key
of the second peer and submit it to contract C so that only the second peer can get the
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Table 3: Service enforcement
Service enforcement protocol
1. Before time ts + |Tt|, the sender must submit hashes of certificates and the encrypted
whisper key to contract C. It must also encrypt the secret key using public keys of
selected peers and transfer it to the first peer.
2. Each selected peer must decrypt one layer of the received encrypted secret key, submit
the obtained certificate to contract C and verify the behavior of previous participants
before its first deadline d1. It must submit encrypted whisper key to contract C before
its second deadline d2 and transfer the secret key to the next peer before its third
deadline d3.
3. Before time tr + |Tt|, the recipient must first decrypt the last layer of the encrypted
secret key to submit the obtained certificate to contract C and then verify the behavior
of both the previous participants and the recipient itself.
4. If any verification launched by a peer (or recipient) in term 2 (or 3) gives False, C
should immediately terminate the service and judge the last participant on the path
that fails to pass the verification to be guilty. Then, C should refund deposit ds to all
innocent participants, pay remuneration r to innocent peers and issue confiscated ds
and unused r to sender.
5. If a verification gives Ture, contract C should refund deposit ds and pay remuneration
r to all participants that have already honestly finished their job before their deadlines.
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whisper key and set up the channel.
Certificate: We design certificates for detecting drop attacks. For each peer and recipient,
we need the sender to secretly generate a unique certificate and package it along with the
corresponding layer of the encrypted secret key. Therefore, upon decrypting the received
encrypted secret key with the private key, the peer (or recipient) will get the unique certifi-
cate. The peer (or recipient) then should submit the certificate to contract C. If the hash of
the submitted certificate is same as the one submitted by the sender, the correct reception
of encrypted secret key can be proved. Otherwise, a drop attack is detected. However, with
certificates, we can only detect that a drop attack has happened between two adjacent peers.
It is hard to further figure out which of the two peers launched the attack as the channel
between them is private. We will discuss how to handle such a dispute in Section 4.2.4.
Verification: We design verification as a function of contract C for enforcing submission
of whisper keys and certificates. A missing whisper key or certificate, both causing a drop
attack, cannot be automatically detected by contract C. Here, we need the verification
function to be triggered by Ethereum peers to check whether the submissions have been made
on time. If all the submissions have been correctly made until the time of verification, the
function returns a True. Otherwise, it returns a False. For each self-emerging data release
service, multiple verifications are required to detect a drop attack in a timely manner so that
the service can be terminated on time and deposits of innocent peers can be unfrozen quickly.
We carefully design the protocol as an extensive-form game with imperfect information to
prove that any rational participant in this game will always choose to submit both whisper
key and certificate on time.
The game induced by the protocol: We model the protocol as an extensive-form game
with imperfect information [79], which can be represented as a game tree in Figure 12.
For ease of explanation, the example only has one peer P between sender S and recipient
R on path, however, the services with more peers follow the same result. The game has
three players {S, P,R}. Its basic actions are (whisper key and/or certificate) submission (s)
and verification (v), so the action set is {s, v, s¯, v¯, sv, sv¯, s¯v, s¯v¯}, where s¯ and v¯ represent
no submission and no verification respectively and sv, sv¯, s¯v, s¯v¯ stand for the combinations.
The game tree consists of choice nodes {n0, ..., n14} and terminal nodes {n15, ..., n30}. At the
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Figure 12: Game tree induced by service enforcement protocol
beginning of the game, sender S ({n0}) can choose either to submit whisper key or not by
taking one action from {s, s¯}. Then, the game moves to peer P ({n1, n2}), who has no idea
about the choice made by sender S (imperfect information). The peer P should choose one
action from {sv, sv¯, s¯v, s¯v¯}, namely four combinations of doing submission and verification
or not, but we argue that sv¯ and s¯v can be omitted. The reason is that a peer P choosing
sv¯ gets same payoff as choosing sv if no previous player has chosen s¯ as there is no need
of verification in this situation. In contrast, if there is at least one previous player who has
chosen s¯, the payoff by choosing sv¯ is equal to that of choosing s¯v¯ as there is no need of
submission when a drop attack has been launched earlier. As a result, sv¯ can be replaced
by sv and s¯v¯, and it is also true for s¯v. Finally, the game goes to the turn of recipient R
({n3, n4}, {n5, n6}), who has no idea of the action taken by sender S and peer P . Similar to
P , recipient R should choose one action from {sv, s¯v¯}, but s here only means the certificate
submission as it is the last peer on the path.
We now analyze the payoffs shown under the terminal nodes, where uS, uP and uR rep-
resent payoff of sender S, peer P and recipient R respectively. The payoffs have uncertainty.
Most peers on the path, by dropping the encrypted secret key, can only save a service cost c,
but some peers can get an additional profit no more than the monetary value of the private
data v (for ease of presentation, we represent it as v in this game). Therefore, it is uncertain
whether peer P and receipt R can get the additional benefit v from dropping the package.
To model this uncertainty, we use P and R to represent the ones only targeting at c and
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P¯ and R¯ to represent the ones also targeting at v. By considering this uncertainty, this
game can actually be modeled as a more sophisticated Bayesian game [17]. However, we
find that the four situations in this game ({PR, PR¯, P¯R, P¯ R¯}) can reach the same Nash
equilibrium [101] and therefore, for ease of explanation, we will only analyze the situation
that both peer P and recipient R can get additional benefit v, namely P¯ R¯.
In P¯ R¯, we will show that if deposit ds > v is satisfied, then the best choice of each player
is to do both submission and verification on time. We start from analyzing the choice of
recipient R between sv and s¯v¯ at the last step of this game. At n3, by choosing sv, R gets
0 at n7, which is higher than uR = v − ds at n8 if s¯v¯ is chosen and ds > v is satisfied. By
further checking n4 to n6, we can find sv always brings uR no less than uR from s¯v¯, which
proves that sv dominates s¯v¯ and R should always choose sv no matter how the game has
been played before. Following the same rule, peer P should always choose sv at {n1, n2} if
ds > v − (r − c) is satisfied. Since we need r > c to make P s get positive profit from the
service, ds > v − (r − c) can be automatically satisfied when ds > v. Finally, with the same
rule, sender S should always choose s at n0.
In game theory, if by taking a strategy, a player can make the expected payoff no less
than that induced by taking any other strategy no matter what strategies are taken by other
players, this strategy will become his or her best response. If all the players are taking their
best responses, the game will reach a Nash equilibrium [101]. Nash equilibrium is the most
important solution concept in game theory, which describes a situation that every player
chooses the best response and no one can make payoff higher by changing strategy if no one
else changes strategy. In this game, the Nash equilibrium is reached when all the players
follow the bold edges, which results in all rational players, whether they are sender, recipient
or peers, choosing to honestly obey the protocol.
4.2.4 Reporting mechanism
In this subsection, we present the last part of the protocol in Table 4, namely reporting
designed for handling both release-ahead attacks and the dispute of drop attacks that are
hard to be detected by service enforcement protocol.
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Table 4: Reporting
Reporting protocol
1. Any peer can report a release-ahead attack to contract C with evidence before tr to
earn an award a.
2. Any peer on the path can report a dispute of drop attack between a suspect (the peer
before this reporter on path) and the reporter to contract C before deposit ds of the
suspect is unfrozen to earn an award a.
Release-ahead attack: As discussed in Section 4.1.3, it is very difficult to detect a secret
release attack made by peers on the path. We design a reporting mechanism to enable a
release-ahead attack to be reported with evidence by adversaries themselves. The evidence
should include a message and the message signed by the private key of the disloyal peer,
which has been released by the peer to the adversary. Then, contract C can verify the
correctness of the private key with the public key of that peer. If the private key is proved to
be the one of this peer, the adversary will get an award, a from contract C while the peer will
lose its deposit ds. This reporting mechanism is an effective way to prevent release-ahead
attacks as long as both adversary and the peer are rational. In the game between them,
the best response of the adversary is to always report the peer to earn the award a from
contract C without any penalty. Based on this knowledge, the best response of any peer
on the path is to never accept bribery. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium of this game makes
such a release-ahead attack never happen.
Dispute of drop attack: As discussed in Section 4.2.3, drop attacks cannot be solely
prevented by verification. After a drop attack is detected between two adjacent peers on
the path when the second peer between the two fails to submit the correct certificate, it is
hard to figure out which peer actually launched it. It can be either launched by the first
peer by not sending the correct encrypted secret key to the second peer or by the second
peer by maliciously denying the reception of the encrypted secret key. In addition, it can be
launched by the sender S by submitting fake hashes of certificates to contract C at the very
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beginning. To solve it, we allow the second account to report the dispute. Upon receiving
the report, contract C should confiscate deposit ds of the three participants and send back
an award a to the second peer. Again, this anti-intuitive reporting mechanism is an effective
way to prevent drop attack dispute by making the three participants as a community of
interests as long as these accounts are rational. In this game, when there is a drop attack,
the second peer has the dominant action to always report the dispute because it will lose
part of its deposit ds − a by reporting it but lose the entire deposit ds due to the missing
certificate by not reporting it. With this knowledge, the best response of the first peer and
sender is to never launch a drop attack because otherwise they will lose the entire deposit
ds > v due to the report. Finally, given the best response of the first peer and sender, if
ds > v + a is satisfied, the best response of the second peer is also to never launch a drop
attack because otherwise it will lose ds − a > v due to the report. As a result, the Nash
equilibrium is reached when all of them choose to never launch a drop attack.
4.3 IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we present the implementation of the proposed self-emerging data release
smart contract and experimentally evaluate its performance and security.
4.3.1 Implementation
We first introduce the implementation setup and then present the functions created in the
smart contract and demonstrate how they work in practice. Finally, we present the test
instance for our experimental evaluation.
Setup: We programmed the smart contract in the contract-oriented programming language
Solidity [11], deployed it to the Ethereum official test network rinkeby [9] and tested it with
Ethereum official Go implementation Geth [6]. We used the SolRsaVerify contract [12] to
verify signatures in the release reporting mechanism. We ran our experiments on an Intel
Core i7 2.70GHz PC with 16GB RAM.
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Table 5: Summary of functions in the smart contract
Sections Invokers Functions Purposes
Register
P newPeer register a new Peer
P updateBalance update deposit balance
P updateWindow update working windows
P updatePubKey update public keys
Setup
S senderSign sender signs the contract
R recipientSign recipient signs the contract
S setup setup the service
Enforce
S setCert submit hashes of certificates
P,R verifyCert verify received certificates
P setWhisperKey submit encrypted whisper keys
P,R verification do verification
Report
Any releaseReport report a release-ahead attack
Any releaseAward get award for reporting release
P,R dropReport report a drop attack
P,R dropAward get award for reporting drop
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Contract functions: We design the smart contract to include 15 main functions for sup-
porting the four parts of protocol presented in Section 4.2. The functions are organized as
follows: The functions are shown in Table 5 with their respective invokers and purposes. For
example, function newPeer() is designed to be invoked by peers during registration phase
for being registered into the list.
• Registration: Peers (P s) can first invoke newPeer() to be registered and recorded into
the peer list and then manage their unfrozen deposit balance, working windows and public
keys through the other three functions.
• Setup: A sender (S) should download the peer list, locally run peer selection algorithm to
select peers from the list and estimate remuneration r. Then, S should sign the contract
through senderSign() and also inform the recipient (R) to sign it through recipientSign().
Finally, S should invoke setup() to complete service setup and the smart contract (C) will
freeze deposit ds of each selected P after verifying payments of S and R and record the
service information into the service list.
• Enforce: At the beginning of a service, S should invoke setCert() to submit hashes of
certificates to C. Then, during the service process, verifyCert() is invoked by P s and R
to submit certifications, setWhisperKey() is invoked by P s to submit encrypted whisper
key and verification() is invoked by P s and R to do verification.
• Report: Any Ethereum peer can invoke releaseReport() to report a release-ahead attack
and get award through releaseAward() after the report has been verified to be correct.
Similarly, P and R on path can report a drop attack through dropReport() and get award
through dropAward().
Test instance: For testing purpose, we generated 100 Ethereum accounts to be registered
as peers. Each peer offers one working window represented as a horizontal segment in Figure
13(a). We design an input parameter Time to simulate the time during testing. As can
be seen, the 100 working windows are distributed in the future 1200 hours. Their start
times follow an exponential distribution with a mean of 300 hours while their lengths follow
a normal distribution with a mean of 15 hours and a standard deviation of 5 hours. The
reason is that we believe more peers may want to serve in the nearer future due to its lower
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Figure 13: Peer selection
uncertainty. From Figure 13(b) to 13(d), we show the results of peer selection algorithm for
sending the private data to 300, 600 and 1000 hours in the future by selecting two, three and
five peers respectively. The storage on each selected P , upon hitting the dotted line, will be
transferred to the next P . In all cases, storage on each P starts from the beginning of its
window, which signifies the design goal of the peer selection algorithm.
4.3.2 Experimental evaluation
We use the presented test instance to experimentally evaluate the performance and security
of the smart contract. We begin by first evaluating the monetary cost and time overhead
of the functions and then test the contract in different conditions including drop attack and
release-ahead attack scenarios.
Monetary cost: The monetary costs of functions in Table 5 for the three-peer case in
Figure 13(c) are shown in Figure 14(a). The results shown represent the maximum possible
monetary costs for invoking the functions. For ease of presentation, results are grouped
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into four clusters. Each cluster represents a protocol subsection and contains three or four
functions following their order in Table 5. In Ethereum, each function call will cost some
gases if it changes the state of contract. Therefore, the raw data measured here is the gas cost
of each function, which is then transferred to cost in $ based on 1 gas = 1.0371979124×10−8
ETH and 1 ETH = $300 as of date, 10/29/2017 [5]. As can be seen, most functions cost
very little. Specifically, among the fifteen functions, eight cost lower than $0.2 and twelve
cost lower than $0.3. The remaining three functions are newPeer() ($0.86), senderSign()
($0.73) and setup() ($2.29). They cost higher as data is stored into the registration list and
service list in C through the three functions. However, since each P only calls newPeer() for
once during registration and each S only calls senderSign() and setup() once during service
setup, these costs are quite acceptable in practice. Thus, in case of three selected P s, a
self-emerging data release service costs $5.07 in total, including $3.33 cost incurred by S,
$0.44 cost incurred by each P and $0.41 cost incurred by R. To study the scalability of
the self-emerging data smart contract, we measured the monetary costs of the functions for
the five-peer case in Figure 13(d) as Figure 14(b). Compared with Figure 14(a), only costs
of three functions setup(), setCert() and verification() are increased as a higher number of
selected P s requires more data to be stored in data list with more certificates and more
rounds of verifications. However, the increments of setCert() and verification() are quite
small and the increment of setup() from $2.29 to $3.56 is not a drastic overhead for storing
the private data for a longer duration of 1000 hours.
Time overhead: The time overheads of functions in Table 5 for the three-peer case in
Figure 13(c) are shown in Figure 14(c). All results are averaged for 100 tests. Among the
fifteen functions, nine spent 0-200ms, three spent 200-300ms and two spent 300-400ms. The
setup() function spent the maximum time of 515ms due to the large amount of service data
for storing. Again, we tested the five-peer case in Figure 13(d) and showed the results in
Figure 14(d). The two more selected peers make the same three functions setup(), setCert()
and verification() spend more time for the same reasons. Here again, the increments are
quite acceptable. In addition, we tested the time overhead of the peer selection algorithm,
which shows that the algorithm is quite efficient by spending less than 20ms for even a peer
list with 1000 working windows.
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Figure 14: Performance evaluation
Table 6: Security evaluation
Cond S P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 R
1. 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
2. 7.872 5.010 5.017 5.026 5.035 5.040 5
3. 8.489 5.010 4.4 5.026 5.035 5.040 5
4. 8.212 5.310 5.017 5.026 5.035 4.4 5
5. 1.347 5.010 5.017 5.026 4.4 1.7 5
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Security evaluation: Finally, we evaluate the security protection offered by the smart
contract by testing the results of a self-emerging data release service in different conditions
when the S, R and P s engage in suspicious behaviors, shown in Table 6. The test is
based on the five-peer case in Figure 13(d) and the parameters about remuneration are
set as α = 0.000012 ETH, β = 1.1, 4r1s = 0.000001 ETH, 4v = 1 ETH, rt = 0.002 ETH
respectively. The parameter setting can be adjusted, but it should not make the remuneration
too low as in that case, one may not be incentivized to freeze $1000 for half a year for earning
a meager payment of $0.1. In addition, we set ds = 1.2v and award a = 0.1v.
• Condition 1: Before the service, S, R and the five P s all hold 5 available ETH. Then, S
wants to send a secret key with its monetary value v = 3 ETH.
• Condition 2: If all the participants follow the protocol honestly, S can earn 2.872 ETH
from the 3 ETH v after paying 0.128 ETH to P s. Each P can earn its remuneration based
on the length of its service time as well as the distance of its service from the setup time
tr. As can be seen, the P5 offering service for 890h-1000h earns much more than P1 serving
for the first 240 hours.
• Condition 3: If P2 does not submit its whisper key or certificate on time, its confiscated
deposit ds = 3.6 ETH will make its final payoff to be 5− 3.6 + 3 = 4.4 ETH.
• Condition 4: If P5 releases its data to P2, P2 can report it to earn the 0.3 ETH award,
which will make P5 get 5− 3.6 + 3 = 4.4 ETH payoff.
• Condition 5: If P4 does not send the secret key to P5 through the private channel, P5 can
report this drop dispute, which will make P4 get 4.4 ETH payoff. Without reporting it to
earn the 0.3 ETH award, P5 can only get 5 − 3.6 = 1.4 ETH payoff due to the failure of
certificate submission.
As can be seen, in conditions 3 to 5, adversaries with misbehavior only get 4.4 ETH payoff,
which makes them lose 0.6 ETH. Therefore, a rational Ethereum peer should always choose
to honestly follow the protocol resulting in condition 2.
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4.4 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In this chapter, we develop decentralized techniques for supporting self-emerging data release
using smart contracts in the Ethereum blockchain network. Our proposed service protocol
implemented as smart contracts is immutable in the Ethereum blockchain. The credibility
and enforceability of the protocol are guaranteed through a careful design based on extensive-
form games with imperfect information to prevent possible post-facto misbehaviors including
drop attacks and release-ahead attacks. We develop the smart contract using Solidity and
implement the system on the Ethereum official test network.
The scenario focused by this chapter requires both the data sender and recipient to be
peers controlling External Owned Accounts (EOAs) through private/public key pairs. In
the next chapter, we will discuss a more challenging scenario, namely releasing self-emerging
data to a Contract Account (CA) controlled by a smart contract, where the recipient is
unable to locally store data or privately communicate with other accounts.
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5.0 PRIVACY-PRESERVING TIMED EXECUTION OF
SMART CONTRACTS
In the previous chapter, we were focusing on releasing self-emerging data to peers who control
EOA accounts through private/public key pairs. In this chapter, we examine a more chal-
lenging scenario that corresponds to the research task T-4 proposed in Section 1.1, namely
releasing self-emerging data to a passive smart contract that has already been deployed by
peers to a CA account. In short, mechanisms satisfying such requirements can facilitate a
wide range of decentralized applications, allowing users to schedule their target smart con-
tracts to be automatically executed at future points of time, without revealing their private
input data (i.e., self-emerging data) before the expected execution time. Next, before going
to the details, we first present the motivations that stimulate our study of releasing self-
emerging data to smart contracts. We then present other key research questions associated
with the objectives of this chapter.
Motivations and objectives: Recent implementations of blockchain-based smart contract
platforms, such as Ethereum [128] and NEO [102], have attracted a large number of de-
velopers to build decentralized applications using smart contracts that avoid the need of a
centralized server to manage and maintain the data [2, 92, 94]. The market cap for the lead-
ing smart contract platform, Ethereum, peaked at $134 billion [52] in 2018 and thousands of
decentralized applications, ranging from social networks to financial software, have been de-
veloped over Ethereum [118]. The Smart Contracts market is estimated to grow at a CAGR
of 32% during the period 2017 to 2023 [117]. A decentralized application may involve one
or more smart contracts and each smart contract may contain multiple functions that need
to be invoked by application users through transactions. For instance, a sealed-bid auction
smart contract [129] requires bidders to reveal their sealed bids by invoking a function (e.g.,
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a reveal() function) during a time window. Similarly, a voting smart contract [92] requires
voters to publish their votes using a vote() function during the voting time window. Each
called function in a smart contract is executed by the entire blockchain network. Since both
function code and function inputs (i.e., bid or vote) are available on the blockchain, the
function outputs are deterministic and their correctness can be verified by the network, thus
cutting out centralized middlemen or intermediaries for running these functions [78]. A key
fundamental limitation of existing smart contract platforms is the lack of support for users
to schedule timed execution of transactions such that their target functions can be invoked
at a later time, even when the users go oﬄine. For example, if Bob plans to take a week off
work and could not respond to an auction or voting mechanism implemented on Ethereum
during the prescribed time windows, he needs a mechanism to schedule these timed trans-
actions by automatically invoking reveal() and vote() during the time windows. Here, the
inputs to these functions namely the bids and the votes are extremely sensitive and need to
be securely protected until the prescribed time windows even when Bob is oﬄine. There-
fore, we need a two-stage mechanism, namely (1) protecting the inputs of a function (i.e.,
self-emerging data) before a prescribed execution time and (2) automatically releasing these
inputs to the contract address (CA) of target smart contract (i.e., auction smart contract)
at the prescribed execution time to make the function get executed by miners.
Challenges: It is easy to implement such a mechanism in centralized application environ-
ments as function inputs can be stored by centralized servers and function execution can be
triggered by centralized servers at prescribed execution time. For instance, Boomerang [30]
allows users of Gmail to schedule their emails to be sent when users have no connection
with the Internet. Similarly, Postfity [108] helps users to schedule messages to be posted
onto many centralized social networks. However, both the two stages of the aforementioned
mechanism is hard to be designed in decentralized platforms such as Ethereum. First, to
guarantee verifiability of function outputs, function inputs need to be put onto the blockchain
and as a result, both function inputs and outputs become public to all peers at the time
the schedule is initialized, thus leading to privacy risks with the input data. Second, when
a transaction invoking a function is deployed into the network, the invoked function is ex-
ecuted immediately, which makes it difficult to support timed execution when the user has
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already gone oﬄine.
Properties of contract accounts (CAs) in Ethereum: Unlike accounts controlled by
peers (i.e., DHT nodes, Ethereum EOAs), a contract account (CA) in Ethereum is passive
and transparent. The execution of any function of deployed smart contracts must be invoked
through either transactions sent by EOAs or messages sent from CAs. All these transaction-
s/messages, as well as function inputs inside them, are publicly recorded by the Ethereum
blockchain, which makes the function outputs deterministic because all miners can execute
the function with the same inputs and gets the same outputs.
Adversary models: In this chapter, we further increase the strength of adopted adversary
models for the purpose of designing more robust countermeasures against potential attacks.
In the previous Chapter 4, we have assumed that all the peers are adversaries with rationality.
In the first part of security analysis in this chapter, we follow the same assumption made
in Chapter 4 and assume that all EOAs are rational adversaries but not malicious. Then,
in the second part of security analysis in this chapter, we further assume that there exists a
malicious (or irrational) adversary targeting a specific service request while all other EOAs
not owned by this malicious adversary are still rational adversaries.
Technical approaches: In this chapter, we observe that instead of requesting an EOA
account to invoke the target function at the release time, it is more effective to invoke the
target function through a message sent by a smart contract. This is because smart contracts
are trustworthy while peers running EOA accounts may perform undesirable misbehaviors.
Therefore, we design a new mechanism that makes self-emerging data get released to a proxy
contract deployed by the user of decentralized applications and then make the proxy contract
automatically call the target function on behalf of the user. The mechanism jointly applies
techniques of data redundancy and cryptocurrency-driven enforcement and can handle ra-
tional adversaries and malicious adversaries altogether. The proposed mechanism does not
reveal function inputs (i.e., self-emerging data) before the execution time window selected
by the user, as the function inputs are privately maintained by a set of trustees randomly
selected from the network and released only during the execution time window. The function
inputs are protected through secret share [114] and multi-layer encryption [45] and possible
misbehaviors of the trustees are made detectable and verifiable through a suit of misbe-
66
havior report mechanisms implemented in the Ethereum Smart Contracts and any verified
misbehavior incurs the monetary penalty on the violator.
Evaluation: We implement the proposed approach using the contract-oriented program-
ming language Solidity [11] and test it on the Ethereum official test network rinkeby [9]
with Ethereum official Go implementation Geth [6]. Our implementation and experimental
evaluation that the proposed approach is effective and the protocol has a low gas cost and
time overhead associated with it.
In the rest of this chapter, we first introduce the timed execution in Ethereum in Section
5.1 and then present the designed protocols in detail in Section 5.2. After providing security
analysis in Section 5.3, we implement and evaluate the proposed protocol on the Ethereum
official test network in Section 5.4. Finally, we summarize this chapter in Section 5.5.
5.1 OVERVIEW OF TIMED EXECUTION IN ETHEREUM
In this section, we first describe the challenges involved in implementing timed execution of
smart contracts over Ethereum. We then present the key ideas behind the proposed solution
and introduce the organization of the proposed protocol and discuss the security challenges
and potential attacks encountered in the proposed approach.
5.1.1 Problem statement
The Ethereum blockchain platform [128] can be viewed as a giant global computer as shown
in Figure 15. If a user creates a EOA and uses the EOA to send a transaction with inputs
x1 and x2 to call function f(x1, x2) of a smart contract C at time t1, function f(x1, x2) will
be executed instantly and the inputs x1 and x2 will be made public. This is acceptable if the
user just wants to reveal x1 and x2 at time t1. However, if the user needs to reveal x1 and
x2 during a future execution time window we, sending the transaction at t1 will not work.
For example, Bob may want to make function reveal(amount, nonce) of a sealed-bid auction
smart contract [129] be executed during a future execution time window we. Then, sending
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Figure 15: At time t1, Bob wants to schedule function reveal(amount,nonce) in contract Sealed-
BidAuction [129] to be executed during a future time window we
the transaction out at t1 will make his bid value be known to all other bidders immediately,
which violates his privacy requirements.
5.1.2 Privacy-preserving timed execution
To support privacy-preserving timed execution of smart contracts, the transaction calling
function f(x1, x2) must be sent during the prescribed execution time window we while inputs
x1 and x2 should not be revealed before we. Our proposed protocol for supporting privacy-
preserving timed execution is implemented as two smart contracts, namely a unique scheduler
contract Cs managing all schedule requests of users in Ethereum and a proxy contract Cp
deployed by each user having a schedule request. At the time of setting a timed execution,
the protocol requires the user to (1) store schedule information, including a cryptographic
keccak-256 hash [21] of function inputs x1 and x2 to the scheduler contract Cs, (2) deploy a
proxy contract Cp and (3) employ a group of EOAs as trustees. The main functionality of
the proxy contract Cp is implemented through a function execute() in it. Once Cp receives
a transaction during we with the desired inputs x1 and x2 verified through their hashes in
scheduler contract Cs, the function execute() will immediately send a message calling the
target function f(x1, x2) with inputs x1 and x2. The trustees are in charge of storing inputs
x1 and x2 off the blockchain before the execution time window we and they send a trans-
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action with the inputs to the proxy contract Cp during we. The terms of the decentralized
secret trust created by the user as a settlor, namely what the trustees can or cannot do,
are programmed as functions in smart contracts Cs and Cp. Each trustee needs to pay a
security deposit d (i.e., Ether) to the scheduler contract Cs and any detectable misbehavior
of this trustee makes the deposit be confiscated. The security deposit serves as an economic
deterrence model for enforcing behaviors of peers in the blockchain network [16, 94]. Finally,
after the trustees have sent a transaction with inputs x1 and x2 to the proxy contract Cp
during we, they can withdraw both their deposit and remuneration paid by the user from the
scheduler contract Cs. In the example of Figure 15, at t1, Bob stores hash of inputs amount
and nonce to Cs, deploys Cp and employs a group of trustees. These trustees, after signing
an agreement with Bob, are in charge of revealing the asset amount and nonce to the benefi-
ciary, proxy contract Cp, during we. During the execution time window we, after the trustees
have sent a transaction with inputs amount and nonce to Cp, the function execute() in Cp
can trigger reveal() in the SealedBidAuction contract through SealedBidAuction.reveal()
and also unlock trustees’ deposit and remuneration in Cs through withdrawPermission().
5.1.3 Protocol overview
The proposed protocol consists of four components:
Trustee application : At any point in time, an EOA can apply to Cs for getting added
into a trustee candidate pool maintained by Cs by submitting its working time window
and paying a security deposit. During the working time window, the EOA should be able
to connect with Ethereum to send transactions to the proxy contract Cp. In the example
shown in Figure 16, we notice that ten EOAs joined the pool. The public pool then makes
the entire network learn that this EOA can provide services during its declared working
times.
User schedule : During setup time window ws, a user can schedule a transaction by reg-
istering the schedule to scheduler contract Cs, deploying a proxy contract Cp, and secretly
selecting trustees from the pool. The selected trustees should keep the function inputs pri-
vately before the execution time window we while revealing them during we to make the
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target function be executed. In Figure 16, during setup window ws, the user informed the
schedule with the scheduler contract Cs and deployed the proxy contract Cp. Then, the user
randomly selected three EOAs from the pool as trustees and signed agreements with the
trustees through private channels created by the whisper protocol [13]. Any data exchanged
through the whisper channels are encrypted and can only be viewed by the data sender and
data recipient.
Function Execution : During execution time window we, the selected trustees submit the
function inputs to the proxy contract Cp through transactions, which triggers Cp to verify
correctness of function inputs with Cs and then call the scheduled function in the target
contract Ct. In Figure 16, during we, the trustees submitted stored data to proxy contract
Cp. After verifying the received data with the hashes stored in scheduler contract Cs, Cp
called the function in Ct.
Misbehavior report : During the entire process, trustees may perform several types of
misbehaviors violating the protocol, such as secretly disclosing stored data before we or
rejecting to submit stored data during we. To tackle these issues, the protocol involves
several misbehavior report mechanisms that allow any witness of a misbehavior to report
it to the scheduler contract Cs and earn a component of the deposit paid by the suspect
trustee once the report is verified to be true.
5.1.4 Security challenges and attack models
The proposed mechanism encounters several critical security challenges, which can be roughly
classified using two attack models.
Time difference attacks: The time difference attack happens when an adversary aims at
obtaining the function inputs at a time point td earlier than the execution time window we
so that he can leverage the time difference between td and we to achieve his purpose. There
are three key methods to launch a time difference attack.
• Malicious trustee: An adversary may choose to create a suite of EOAs and make all
these EOAs join the pool so that once some of these EOAs are selected as trustees, the
adversary is able to obtain the stored data directly. To protect the system from malicious
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Figure 16: Protocol overview
trustees, the protocol employs both secret share [114] and multi-layer encryption [45] in
user schedule component of the protocol.
• Trustee identity disclosure: In user schedule component of the protocol, trustees are
secretly selected by user U . Therefore, from the perspective of EOAs besides the selected
trustees and user U , all EOAs in network with working time windows satisfying U ’s re-
quirement have equal chance to be selected by U , thus protecting the identifications of
selected trustees with highest entropy and uncertainty. However, a trustee, after being
selected, may maliciously announce its identity to the public to seek trade with potential
adversaries about the stored data. To prevent such misbehavior, the proposed protocol
employs a trustee identity disclosure report mechanism in misbehavior report component
of the protocol, which forces a trustee to disclose its identity with the sacrifice of the
confiscation of its security deposit.
• Advance disclosure: A trustee may choose to voluntarily disclose the stored data to
the entire network without seeking bribery. To penalize such misbehavior, an advance
disclosure report mechanism is employed in the misbehavior report component, which
makes any trustee disclosing its stored data in advance lose its security deposit.
Execution failure attack: The execution failure attack happens when an adversary aims
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at making the execution of the target function fail during the execution time window we.
There are two key methods to launch this attack.
• Absent trustee: A trustee may become absent during the execution time window we,
which makes its stored data get lost. To prevent this type of misbehavior, the user schedule
component of protocol requires each selected trustee to provide a signature, which will only
be revealed along with the function inputs during we. Therefore, before we, the identities
of trustees are kept secret. In contrast, during we, the identities become public so that any
present trustee can report an absent trustee through the absent trustee report mechanism
in the misbehavior report component of protocol, which penalizes any absent trustee by
confiscating its security deposit.
• Fake submission: A trustee may submit fake stored data to the proxy contract Cp during
we, which may cause the restoration of the function inputs to fail. The protocol handles
this type of misbehavior using the fake submission report mechanism in the misbehavior
report component of protocol, which confiscates violator’s security deposit if its submission
is proved to be fake.
5.2 PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
In this section, we present the proposed protocol organized along the four components in-
troduced in Section 5.1.3.
5.2.1 Trustee application
The first component trustee application allows EOAs that want to earn remuneration through
the trustee job to register to the scheduler contract Cs and make their information public.
We present the trustee application protocol in Table 7, which consists of three key steps.
Step 1: Each trustee candidate should be a newly generated EOA, which only has an
amount of Ether (the cryptocurrency in Ethereum) that will be submitted to the scheduler
contract Cs as security deposit d in step 2. No additional Ether should be left because we
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Table 7: Trustee application
Trustee application protocol
Input: scheduler contract Cs
Apply:
1. An Ethereum node creates a new EOA.
2. This EOA applies to the scheduler contract Cs for being added into the trustee candidate
pool by submitting a public key, a whisper key, working time window, a security deposit
and a beneficiary address.
3. The scheduler contract Cs verifies the application and accept the application if all
required data has been submitted.
will need the account to make its account private key public during execution time window
we.
Step 2-3: An EOA should apply for the trustee candidate by sending a transaction to Cs
with the five listed information.
• The public key will later be used by user U in step 8 of user schedule component to
generate onions [45]. Here, the term onion refers to the output of iteratively encrypting
data with multiple public keys.
• The whisper key will later be used by user U in user schedule component to establish
private channel with this EOA through whisper protocol [13].
• The working time window will be used by user U in step 6 and 10 of user schedule com-
ponent to select trustees satisfying U ’s requirements (i.e., execution time window).
• The security deposit is a fixed amount of Ether hard-coded in scheduler contract Cs.
Once being submitted to Cs, the deposit can only be withdrawn at the end of EOA’s
working time window, if there is no misbehavior reported through report mechanisms in
misbehavior report components.
• Finally, the protocol needs the EOA to make its account private key public in function
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execution component, so the beneficiary address will be the address of a safe EOA to
receive deposit and remuneration withdraw.
5.2.2 User schedule
The second component user schedule prescribes how a user should set a schedule through
three key operations, namely deploying a proxy contract (step 3), registering the schedule
information to scheduler contract Cs (step 4) and implementing a two-round trustee selection
(step 5-13). We present this component in Table 8. For the illustration of the protocol in
step 5 to 13, we will use the example shown in Figure 17.
Step 2: The total remuneration that should be paid by user U is r = nlrt + re, where rd
is a fixed per trustee remuneration hard-coded in Cs and re is a fixed amount of reward
hard-coded in Cm paying to the first trustee calling execute() in Ct during we. Both rd and
re can only be withdrawn by trustees after the end of execution time window we.
Step 4: After the schedule has been registered in Cs, the on-chain schedule information
cannot be modified. Therefore, the information can be used by trustee candidates later in
step 7 and 11 to verify the information transmitted through off-chain whisper channels from
user U .
Step 5: The Shamir secret sharing scheme [114] with parameter (m,n) can split the key
to n shares. Later, any m shares among the n can be combined to restore the key while
even m − 1 shares fail to do it. Therefore, even if some shares are compromised, the
compromised shares may be insufficient to restore the key before execution window we
while the rest shares may still be sufficient to restore the key during we. In the example of
Figure 16, we set (m,n) = (2, 3), so three shares are generated from key after splitting.
Step 6-13: The design of two-round trustee selection implements the decentralized secret
trust. The trustees selected in the first round should agree the user encrypt the shares with
their public keys for multiple layers so that the shares become onions [45] and harder to be
compromised. Then, the trustees selected in the second round should take charge of storing
these onions. Later, during we, once both the private keys of the first-round trustees and
onions stored by the second-round trustees are made public, the key can be restored to
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Table 8: User schedule
User schedule protocol
Input: scheduler contract Cs, target contract Ct
Initialization:
1. User U decides function inputs IN , execution time window we, secret sharing parameters
(m,n), number of layers l, a 256-bit secret key key and a 256-bit random number RU .
2. User U computes the remuneration r.
3. User U deploys proxy contract Cp to the network.
4. User U registers the schedule to scheduler contract Cs with (we,m, n, l, C
addr
p , r) and receive
a schedule ID sid.
5. User U splits key to n shares through (m,n) secret sharing.
First-round trustee selection:
6. User U randomly selects n(l−1) trustees and sends each trustee a (sid, tid), where tid refers
to a non-repeated ID in the range of [0, n(l − 1)) assigned to the trustee.
7. Each selected trustee T then does the following:
7.1. Verify (Uaddr, sid, tid, we, r) with Cs.
7.2. Generate a 256-bit random number RT .
7.3. Take keccak256 hash h(T addr, RT ).
7.4. Sign (Uaddr, sid, tid, h(T addr, RT )) with T ’s private key, which gives signature vrs =
(v, r, s).
7.5. Send h(T addr, RT ) and vrs back to U .
8. User U encrypts shares to onions with public keys of selected trustees.
9. User U takes keccak256 hash h(onion) of each onion and submits the hash values to Cs.
Second-round trustee selection:
10. User U randomly selects n trustees and sends each trustee a (sid, tid, onion), where tid is
non-repeated in [n(l − 1), nl).
11. Each selected trustee T follows step 7, but in addition verifying received onion with
h(onion) in Cs.
Ciphertext and hash disclosure:
12. User U encrypts (IN, vrs,RU ) with key and make E(key, (IN, vrs,RU )) public.
13. User U submits keccak256 hash h(IN,RU ) and each trustee’s h(T
addr, RT ) to Cs.
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decrypt the function inputs. The process offers following additional security features:
• The identities of selected trustees are kept private. In these steps, each trustee only
communicates with the user through a whisper channel and all information that needs
to be made public are announced by the user (step 9,12,13). Therefore, the identity of
each trustee is only known to the user. This feature helps in suppressing collusion among
trustees.
• The identities of selected trustees are verifiable and only the trustees can pass the verifi-
cation. To be verified as a specific trustee, both the trustee’s address T addr and the nonce
RT need to be submitted to Cs and their hash should match with the one submitted by
user in step 13. Since RT is created by the trustee, only the trustee has the ability to pass
the verification. This feature also helps in suppressing collusion among trustees. We will
discuss it in detail later in misbehavior report component.
• The identities of selected trustees are undeniable. The user has signatures of the trustees
(step 7,11) and the encrypted signatures are made public in step 12. Therefore, once key
is restored during we, the decrypted signatures can reveal the identities of all trustees.
This feature helps in detecting absent trustees who disappear during we.
• The trustees are also protected against malicious users. It may be insecure to only allow
users to publicly speak. A malicious user may fabricate information and make trustees
lose security deposit. To protect trustees from such users. Once a user has registered a
schedule in step 4, the submitted information cannot be changed. Then, in step 7 and 11,
each trustee can check the information before sending a signature to the user. This is also
the main reason that we need two rounds. In step 11, the second-round trustees should
first verify the correctness of the onions with the hash submitted by the user in step 9 and
then provide signatures.
In the example of Figure 17, six trustees (T1-T6) are selected by user U in the first round
and their six public keys encrypt each of the three shares with two layers, thus turning
the shares into two-layer onions. Then, three trustees (T7-T9) are selected by user U in
the second round to store the three onions. Finally, U ends the schedule by making the
ciphertext public and submitting all hash values to Cs.
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Figure 17: User schedule example
Table 9: Function execution
Function execution protocol
Input: scheduler contract Cs
Submission (first half of we):
1. Each trustee T verifies its identity with h(T addr, RT ) by submitting RT to Cs.
2. Each trustee T submits onion or its private key to Cs, where onion should be verified
with h(onion).
Execution (second half of we):
3. Any trustee T can get shares by decrypting onions with the private keys.
4. Any trustee T can get key by combing any m shares.
5. Any trustee T can get (IN, vrs, RU) by doing D(key, E(key, (IN, vrs, RU))).
6. Any trustee T can submit (IN,RU) to proxy contract Cp, where (IN,RU) can be
verified with h(IN,RU) in Cs and the correct function inputs IN will trigger Cp to call
the target contract Ct.
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5.2.3 Function Execution
The third component of the protocol, function execution indicates how the trustees selected in
user schedule component should collaboratively reveal the function inputs during execution
window we and send a transaction with the function inputs to the proxy contract Cp through
two phases, namely submission (step 1-2) and execution (step 3-6). We present the third
component in Table 9.
Step 1-2: The submission phase indicates the first half of execution window we, during
which the protocol requires first-round and second-round trustees to submit their private
keys and stored onions, respectively. To submit either a private key or an onion, a trustee
should also provide the nonce RT generated in step 7 and 11 of user schedule so that its
identity can be verified with h(T addr, RT ).
Step 3-6: The execution phase refers to the second half of execution window we. Since both
onions and private keys have been submitted, during this phase, any verified trustee should
be able to turn onions back to shares. Then, based on Shamir secret sharing scheme, any m
shares can be combined to restore the key created by user S in step 1 of user schedule. After
getting the key, any trustee is able to decrypt the encrypted (IN, vrs, RU). Finally, before
the end of we, a verified trustee, after obtaining function inputs IN and nonce RU , should
send proxy contract Cp a transaction with both IN and RU . Then, Cp will immediately verify
received IN and RU with h(IN,RU) in scheduler contract Cs. If both of them are correct,
Cp immediately send a message with IN to the target contract Ct to call the scheduled
function.
5.2.4 Misbehavior report
The misbehavior report represents the final component of the protocol and involves four
types of misbehaviors that will result in the violator’s security deposit being confiscated. All
these misbehaviors are witnessable and the protocol rewards the reporter of a misbehavior
a component of the violator’s security deposit as an incentive while sending the rest of the
violator’s security deposit to the user. We present this final component in Table 10.
Trustee identity disclosure report: This report mechanism is designed to handle the
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Table 10: Misbehavior report
Misbehavior report protocol
Input: scheduler contract Cs
Trustee identity disclosure report:
1. Before the start of execution time we, any EOA can report a trustee identity disclosure
misbehavior by submitting the nonce RT of the violator to scheduler contract Cs.
2. If h(T addr, RT ) using the submitted RT is same as the one in Cs, the misbehavior is
verified.
Advance disclosure report:
3. Before the start of execution time we, any EOA can report an advance disclosure mis-
behavior by submitting the private key belonging to the violator to scheduler contract
Cs.
4. If the public key derived from that private key is same as the violator’s public key in
Cs, the misbehavior is verified.
Absent trustee report:
5. After step 5 in function execution, any trustee can report an absent trustee misbehavior
to scheduler contract Cs by submitting the signature vrs of the absent trustee.
6. The address of the violator can be derived through T =
sigV erify((Uaddr, sid, tid, h(T addr, RT )), vrs).
Fake submission report:
7. After step 2 in function execution, any trustee can report a fake submission misbehavior
to scheduler contract Cs if the trustee finds a submitted private key is incorrect.
8. If the public key derived from that private key is different from violator’s public key in
Cs, the misbehavior is verified.
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trustee identity disclosure misbehavior presented in Section 5.1.4. Before the start of exe-
cution window we, a trustee may choose to reveal its identity to seek collusion. To prove
its identity, the violator has to reveal the nonce RT created by itself in step 7/11 of user
schedule so that its identity can become verifiable through h(T addr, RT ) in Cs. However,
with this report mechanism, any EOA, after knowing RT before we, can report it to Cs to
earn reward.
Advance disclosure report: The advance disclosure misbehavior introduced in the Sec-
tion 5.1.4 can be handled using this report mechanism. Before the start of we, a round-one
trustee may choose to disclose its private key, which may help an adversary to decrypt
onions to shares, restore key and obtain IN before the start of we. However, with this
report mechanism, any EOA, after knowing violator’s private key before we, can betray the
violator by reporting it to Cs.
Absent trustee report: This report mechanism handles the absent trustee misbehavior
described in Section 5.1.4. Any trustee may become absent during we, thus increasing
the failure chance of schedule. With this report mechanism, any trustee, after obtaining
signatures of all other trustees in step 5 of function execution, can locally verify attendance
of all other trustees, thus being able to report absent trustees to Cs.
Fake submission report: Finally, the design of fake submission report aims at dealing with
the fake submission misbehavior presented in Section 5.1.4. In step 2 of function execution,
a submitted private key may not be the right one. Any trustee can locally verify a private
key submitted by a suspect trustee through deriving the corresponding public key from the
private key and comparing it with the public key submitted by that suspect trustee during
trustee application, thus becoming able to report violators to Cs.
5.3 SECURITY ANALYSIS
Next, we analyze the security guarantees of the proposed approach by modeling adversaries
in two different categories, namely rational adversaries and malicious adversaries. Specifi-
cally, in Section 5.3.1, we start by assuming that all EOAs are rational adversaries but not
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Figure 18: Schedule success rate when 5% of trustees perform misbehaviors inadvertently
malicious. Then, in Section 5.3.2, we further assume that there exists a malicious adversary
targeting user U ’s private data while all other EOAs not owned by this malicious adversary
are still rational adversaries.
5.3.1 Rational adversary
We have introduced the properties of rational adversaries in Chapter 4. In this chapter,
we start by assuming that all EOAs in the network are rational adversaries but no one is
malicious. Without countermeasures, such rational adversaries, after being selected by user
as trustees, may perform four types of misbehaviors introduced in Section 5.1.3, including
trustee identity disclosure, advance disclosure, absent trustee and fake submission. As per
the four misbehavior report mechanisms designed in misbehavior report component, as long
as the key can be restored during the execution time window we, any of the four types of
misbehaviors will lead to confiscation of the violator’s deposit. To prevent restoration of
the key so that misbehaviors can be performed in free, a certain fraction of trustees must
collude to not submit their stored data (i.e., onion or private key) together. However, due to
trustee identity disclosure report mechanism in misbehavior report, revealing trustee identity
to other EOAs means losing deposit, so such a collusion will not happen among rational
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Figure 19: Schedule success rate when 50% of trustees are malicious
adversaries. Therefore, when there is no malicious adversary, rational adversaries will never
voluntarily perform misbehaviors.
It is possible that a rational adversary performs misbehaviors inadvertently, such as
forgetting providing the service or losing EOA’s private key. Such kinds of inadvertent mis-
behaviors lead to same results of intentionally performing absent trustee misbehavior. If we
denote the percentage of EOAs performing inadvertent misbehaviors as pIM , the success rate
of a schedule with parameters (l,m, n) will be computed through the Cumulative Distribu-
tion Function of Binomial distribution, namely SR = 1−∑ni=n−m+1 (ni)P i(1−P )n−i, where
P = 1− (1−pIM)l represents the probability that one share is lost. In Figure 18, we present
the computed schedule success rate when 5% of trustees perform misbehaviors inadvertently.
Specifically, in Figure 18(a), by fixing n to 5 and changing m from 1 to 5, it shows that a
smaller m, namely lower threshold for restoring key, performs higher resistance against in-
advertent misbehaviors. By further changing l from 3 to 5, we can find that a smaller l offers
better resistance against inadvertent misbehaviors. Then, in Figure 18(b), n is increased to
10. The increment of n enhances the resistance against inadvertent misbehaviors when m
and l do not change. Thus, larger l and n while smaller m help maintaining high resistance
against inadvertent misbehaviors.
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5.3.2 Malicious adversary
We next assume that there exists a malicious adversary aiming at attacking a specific user
U while the rest of EOAs are rational adversaries. The malicious adversary may choose
to launch either a time difference attack or an execution failure attack. There are two
approaches to launch the two types of attacks, namely trustee bribery and Sybil attack [48].
Through trustee bribery, the malicious adversary can deploy a smart contract with a fund
larger than the security deposit d and use this smart contract as bait to bribe a trustee,
even if the trustee’s identity is not known. For example, to obtain a specific trustee’s private
key for launching a time difference attack, the smart contract can be set with a condition
‘If any EOA in the network can submit the private key owned by the trustee who is in
charge of (Uaddr, sid, tid) to the bribery contract before U ’s execution time window, the
EOA can withdraw the fund stored in bribery contract.’ Since the fund in bribery contract
is larger than the security deposit, a rational trustee may choose to reveal the private key
to the bribery contract to increase its profit. Besides, the malicious adversary can create an
arbitrary amount of EOAs and make all these EOAs join the trustee candidate pool. This
attack approach was named Sybil attack [48].
We now analyze the cost to make either a time difference attack or an execution failure
attack successful.
Lemma 3. To launch a successful execution failure attack, a malicious adversary needs to
spend at least (n−m+ 1)d.
Proof. To launch a successful execution failure attack, a malicious adversary should aim at
impeding the restoration of key at execution time, which means at least n −m + 1 shares
should be dropped. The drop of a single share may be implemented by either a rational
trustee bribed by the malicious adversary or a trustee directly controlled by the malicious
adversary through Sybil attack. However, in both the two conditions, due to the existence
of the misbehavior report mechanisms, the drop of a single share will cost security deposit
d, so the cost of dropping n−m+ 1 shares will be at least (n−m+ 1)d.
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Lemma 4. A malicious adversary needs to spend at least m(l − 1)d to bribe trustees for
making a time difference attack successful.
Proof. To bribe trustees for making a time difference attack successful, a malicious adversary
should aim at restoring key before execution time window we, which means at least m shares
should be obtained before we. To obtain a single share, the malicious adversary needs to
deploy l − 1 bribery smart contracts to collecting private keys from l − 1 different trustees,
which, due to the existence of the misbehavior report mechanisms, will cost at least (l−1)d.
Therefore, the cost of obtaining m shares before we will be at least m(l − 1)d.
Lemma 5. Through Sybil attacks [48], the expected value of security deposit that a malicious
adversary needs to pay to launch a successful time difference attack is (l − 2)vd, where v
denotes the number of trustee candidates available to user U that are not controlled by this
malicious adversary.
Proof. The situation refers to the malicious trustee method introduced in Section 5.1.4, where
the trustee candidates available to user U during user schedule component can be divided
into two parts. By denoting the number of rational candidates not controlled by the malicious
adversary as v and the number of malicious candidates injected by the malicious adversary as
x, we get pM =
x
x+v
→ x = vpM
1−pM , where pM denotes the percentage of malicious candidates.
To obtain a single share, all the l − 1 trustees providing private keys for encrypting this
share to an onion should be selected from malicious candidates, which has the probability
pl−1M . Since there are n shares in total, the overall process can be viewed as a Binomial
distribution B(n, pl−1M ) with mean np
l−1
M . Then, the expected amount of security deposit d̂
that should be paid by the malicious adversary to make npl−1M = m can be computed with
d̂
xd
= m
npl−1M
, which makes d̂ = x · dm
npl−1M
= vpM
1−pM · dmnpl−1M =
vdm
n
· p2−lM
1−pM . Since the malicious
adversary cannot control (v, d,m, n), to minimize d̂, we set f(pM) =
vdm
n
· p2−lM
1−pM and compute
f ′(pM) = 0, which gives
(2−l)p1−lM
1−pM +
p2−lM
(1−pM )2 = 0→ pM = l−2l−1 Therefore, when d̂ is minimized:
x = v · l−2
l−1 · (l − 1) = (l − 2)v → d̂min = (l − 2)vd
For example, when v = 10000, l = 4 and d = $100, d̂min will be four million dollars. In
Figure 19, we present the computed schedule success rate when 50% of trustees are controlled
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by a malicious adversary who aims at launching a time difference attack. As can be seen,
smaller m while larger n and l help enhancing the resistance against time difference attacks
performed through Sybil attack.
5.4 IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we present the implementation of the proposed protocol and discuss the
experimental evaluation of the proposed mechanism in Ethereum.
5.4.1 Implementation of protocol
We first introduce the implementation setup and then present both key off-chain functions in
node.js and on-chain functions in Solidity [11] and demonstrate how they work in practice.
After that, we present two test instances used in our experimental evaluation.
Setup: We programmed the smart contracts in Solidity [11], the most commonly used
smart contract programming language, deployed them to the Ethereum official test net-
work rinkeby [9] and tested them with Ethereum official Go implementation Geth [6]. Our
experiments are performed on an Intel Core i7 2.70GHz PC with 16GB RAM.
Implemented functions: The protocol primarily relies on 6 off-chain functions shown in
Table 11 and 15 on-chain functions shown in Table 12. In both the tables, we show the
components and steps where each function works in protocol. For example, function share()
is used in step 5 of user schedule component to split key to n shares using Shamir secret
sharing [114].
• Trustee application : Any EOA in the network can invoke newCandidate() to join the
trustee candidate pool maintained by scheduler contract Cs.
• User schedule : Any EOA can invoke newUser() to be recorded as a user and then
set up new schedule through newSchedule(). Then, during whisper communication with
trustees, h(onion) should be submitted to Cs through setOnion() while h(T
addr, RT ) and
h(IN,RU) should be submitted to Cs through setTrustee(). Meanwhile, the generation of
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Table 11: Key off-chain functions in node.js, share() and combine() are in secrets.js [113],
ecsign() is in ethereumjs-util [53], encrypt() and decrypt() are in eth-ecies [51], soliditySha3()
is in web3-utils [127]
Component Step Function Purpose
Schedule
5 share split key to shares
7,11 ecsign sign data with private key
8 encrypt encrypt shares to onions
9,13 soliditySha3 compute keccak256 hash
Execute
3 combine combine shares to key
4 decrypt decrypt onions to shares
shares, signatures, onions and hash values are completed by share(), ecsign(), encrypt(),
soliditySha3() in node.js, respectively.
• Function execution : A trustee can submit private key and onion through submit-
Privkey() and submitOnion(), respectively. Then, after decrypting onions to shares
through decrypt() and combining shares to key through combine(), any trustee has the
ability to make the target function be executed through execute(). Finally, after the execu-
tion window is over, trustees can withdraw deposit and remuneration through withdrawD()
and withdrawR(), respectively.
• Misbehavior report : The four types of report mechanisms are implemented by iden-
tityReport(), advanceReport(), absentReport() and fakeReport(), respectively. Then, after
the execution window is over, reporters can withdraw reward through withdrawA().
Test instance: We design two test instances A and B as in Table 13: Instance A employs
15 trustees while instance B employs 40 trustees. As a result, instance B has higher schedule
success rate under both 5% inadvertent misbehaviors (IM) and 50% malicious (M) trustees.
Besides, based on Lemma 1 (L1), Lemma 2 (L2) and Lemma 3 (L3), the cost of malicious
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Table 12: Key on-chain functions in solidity, the three colored functions are in proxy contract
Cp, the rest of the functions are in scheduler contract Cs
Component Step Function Purpose
Apply 2,3 newCandidate join candidate pool
Schedule
4 newUser register as a new user
4 newSchedule initialize a new schedule
9 setOnion submit hashes of onions
13 setTrustee submit hashes of trustees
Execute
1,2 submitPrivkey submit private key
1,2 submitOnion submit onion
6 execute execute the target contract
7 withdrawD withdraw security deposit
7 withdrawR withdraw remuneration
Report
1,2 identityReport report identity disclosure
3,4 advanceReport report advance disclosure
5,6 absentReport report absent trustee
7,8 fakeReport report fake submission
2,4,6,8 withdrawA withdraw report award
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Table 13: Test instances
Instance l,m,n 5% IM 50% M L1 L2 L3
A 3,2,5 99.82% 98.44% 4d 4d vd
B 4,4,10 99.95% 99.99% 7d 12d 2vd
adversaries in instance B is higher than that in instance A. However, since instance B requires
more trustees in instance A, user U ’s cost in instance B is also higher than that in instance
A, which is the price of stronger security guarantee. In both instance A and B, we use the
SealedBidAuction contract [129] as the target contract Ct and we assumed user’s goal was
to schedule a transaction calling function reveal(amount, nonce). Specifically, we designed
an input parameter time to simulate the time during testing.
5.4.2 Experimental evaluation
We use the presented test instances to experimentally evaluate the performance of the smart
contracts, namely the gas cost and time overhead of each function presented in Table 12.
Gas cost: Gas is spent in Ethereum for deploying smart contracts or calling functions.
The gas costs of functions in Table 12 for instance A and B are shown in Figure 20(a) and
Figure 20(b), respectively. For ease of presentation, results are grouped into four clusters.
Each cluster represents a protocol component and contains a group of functions following
their order in Table 12. As can be seen, most functions cost very little. Specifically, among
the fifteen functions, eight cost lower than 105 gas and eleven cost lower than 2 × 105 gas.
Among the rest four functions, both advanceReport() and fakeReport() cost around 8.5×105
because the two functions need to derive public key from private key on chain. Gas costs
of the last two functions, namely setOnion() and setTrustee(), change with n and nl,
respectively. From instance A to B, l increases from 3 to 4 and n increases from 5 to 10.
As a result, gas cost of setOnion() increases from 1.40 × 105 to 2.55 × 105 and gas cost of
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Figure 20: Gas cost
settrustee() increases from 7.17× 105 to 1.87× 106.
To complete a schedule, some functions need to be invoked for multiple times. In Ta-
ble 14, we show the number of times that each function needs to be invoked in a single
schedule when there is no report needed:
Besides, the gas cost of deploying proxy contract Cp is about 1.33 × 106. Therefore,
the total gas costs of instance A and B are 7.60 × 106 and 1.72 × 107, respectively. Both
gas price and Ether price keeps dramatically swinging [5]. For example, based on prices
of date 12/5/2016, instance A and B cost $1.2 and $2.72, respectively. However, based
Table 14: Call count of functions in a single schedule
Function No. Function No. Function No.
newCandidate nl setTrustee 1 execute 1
newSschedule 1 submitPrivkey n(l − 1) withdrawD nl
setOnion 1 submitOnion n withdrawR nl
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on prices of date 10/29/2017, the two instances cost $22.8 and $51.6, respectively. As
can be seen, the monetary cost of a timed-execution service is highly influenced by the
fluctuation of cryptocurrency market, which may be a common limitation of cryptocurrency-
based applications.
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Figure 21: Time overhead
Time overhead: The time overheads of functions in Table 12 for instance A and B are shown
in Figure 21(a) and Figure 21(b), respectively. All results are averaged for 100 tests. Among
the fifteen functions, fourteen functions spend 0-200ms. It is the function setTrustee() that
spends more time to record information of all the trustees to the blockchain. Specifically,
setTrustee() spends 375ms for instance A while 881ms for instance B as there are more
trustees in instance B.
5.5 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In this chapter, we develop a new decentralized privacy-preserving timed execution mech-
anism that allows users of Ethereum-based decentralized applications to schedule timed
transactions without revealing sensitive inputs before an execution time window chosen by
the users. The proposed approach involves no centralized party and allows users to go oﬄine
at their discretion after scheduling a timed transaction. The timed execution mechanism pro-
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tects the sensitive inputs by employing a set of trustees from the decentralized blockchain
network to enable the inputs to be revealed only during the execution time. We implement
the proposed approach using Solidity and evaluate the system on the Ethereum official test
network. Our rigorous theoretical analysis and extensive experiments validate the security
properties and demonstrate the low gas cost and low time overhead associated with the
proposed approach.
Among the three research components proposed in Chapter 1.1, namely Infrastructure,
Output and Input, we have discussed Infrastructure in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 and also
Output in this chapter. In the next chapter, we will examine the last component Input and
look for a solution that can support the cost-effective gradual release of self-emerging data.
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6.0 GRADUAL RELEASE OF PRIVATE DATA OVER TIME
Figure 22: All-or-nothing release and gradual release
We have investigated decentralized mechanisms of releasing self-emerging data with DHT
infrastructure and blockchain infrastructure respectively in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 and
have also examined approaches of outputting self-emerging data to smart contracts in Chap-
ter 5. In this chapter, we explore the research task T-4, namely the last research task
proposed in this dissertation, which aims at developing techniques to support gradual re-
lease of self-emerging data in a cost-effective way. As shown in Figure 22, depending on how
the data sensitivity changes over time, an application requiring to release self-emerging data
may choose between two schemes:
• All-or-nothing release: It is used when data sensitivity suddenly drops at a future time
point, allowing the data user (i.e., recipient) gets nothing useful before the time while
learning what he expects only after the time. Data is released for a single time.
• Gradual release: It is used when data sensitivity gradually reduces over time, allowing
the data utility to keep increasing along with the continuously dropping data sensitivity.
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Data is released for multiple times.
We notice that all-or-nothing release is a special case of gradual release, so we only focus on
the more challenging gradual release of private data in the rest of this chapter.
Next, depending on the ways of inputting private data to the designed systems, the
cost of gradual release using the systems designed in the previous chapters could be quite
different. As we have discussed in Section 1.1, an application can choose among three
options to input the private data into the system, namely the plaintext, its encryption key
or its perturbation key. Obviously, simply inputting the plaintext of private data will result
in both high storage cost and high communication cost when the size of private data is
large (e.g., a healthcare dataset). Therefore, in the rest of this chapter, we first explore the
rest two options in Section 6.1, namely encryption key and perturbation key, to determine
a cost-effective approach for the gradual release of private data. After that, in Section 6.2
and Section 6.3, we develop techniques of implementing the cost-effective approach in two
representative scenarios, namely association data disclosure and location data disclosure,
respectively. Finally, we summarize this chapter in Section 6.4.
6.1 COST-EFFECTIVE GRADUAL RELEASE OF PRIVATE DATA
In this section, we first present an approach of using encryption keys for gradual release of
private data and then discuss the way of reducing the cost by replacing encryption keys with
perturbation keys.
The approach of using encryption keys for gradual release is shown in Figure 23. In this
approach, at the initial time point tA, the data owner (i.e., sender) can operate a specific
privacy-preserving data perturbation technique (e.g., [36, 37, 38, 49, 54, 71, 73, 85, 66])
over the private data for multiple times so that multiple snapshots of the private data with
different perturbation levels (and thus different utility levels) can be generated. Then, after
encrypting all the snapshots with different encryption keys (denoted as EKey), the encryp-
tion keys (except EKey1) and encrypted snapshots should be sent into the decentralized
self-emerging data release system and a cloud storage platform respectively. Specifically,
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Figure 23: Using encryption keys for gradual release of private data
EKey1 can be directly used by the data user (i.e., recipient) to get the most heavily per-
turbed snapshot. After that, the data sensitivity may keep dropping as time goes by. At a
future time point tB, the encryption key EKey2 will be released by the decentralized self-
emerging data release system, allowing the data user to decrypt the moderately perturbed
snapshot in cloud and thus obtaining more useful information from it. Similarly, at an even
remoter time point tC , the released encryption key EKey3 will allow the user to gain further
information from the decrypted minimally perturbed snapshot.
However, we find that a major limitation of using encryption keys is the cost for storing
multiple encrypted snapshots of the dataset. In case that the Amazon S3 cloud storage
service is used (0.023 USD/GB per month), to release one 100GB snapshot per month for
one year (i.e. first month: release one snapshot, store the rest eleven snapshots; second
month: release one snapshot, store the rest ten snapshots...), the storage cost will be about
150 USD. We believe such a high storage cost is unnecessary, so we further proposed the cost-
effective approach shown in Figure 24. The key idea behind this approach is to develop a new
class of reversible perturbation techniques that can use perturbation keys (denoted as PKey)
to pseudo-randomly perturb data so that these keys, once being released in future, can be
used to directly de-perturb the single snapshot held by the user to reduce its perturbation
level. We say the perturbation level of such kind of snapshots is reversible because it can be
reduced by perturbation keys in future. In Figure 24, at tA, with the reversible perturbation
techniques, the perturbation key PKey2 pseudo-randomly perturbs the minimally perturbed
snapshot to the moderately perturbed snapshot. Then, PKey1 further pseudo-randomly
perturbs the moderately perturbed snapshot to the heavily perturbed snapshot. At this
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Figure 24: Cost-effective gradual release of private data by using perturbation keys
phase, all the snapshots except the most heavily perturbed one can be deleted and only
the encrypted heavily perturbed snapshot should be stored in cloud. Also, the data owner
should send the perturbation keys into the decentralized self-emerging data release system
while sending the encryption key of the heavily perturbed snapshot directly to the data
user. After that, at future time point tB, with the released PKey1, the user can de-perturb
the heavily perturbed snapshot to the moderately perturbed snapshot. Similarly, at tC , the
minimally perturbed snapshot can be recovered from the moderately perturbed snapshot
using the released PKey2. Compared with the approach of using encryption keys, the cost-
effective approach only needs to maintain one snapshot as the ‘seed’ of all other snapshots,
thus significantly reducing the cost.
In the next two sections, we present techniques of gradually releasing two types of com-
monly used data, namely association data (Section 6.2) and location data (Section 6.3),
using the cost-effective approach presented in this section. At the core of these techniques
is the use of pseudo-randomness created by perturbation keys in the privacy-preserving data
perturbation mechanisms. In order to making the process of data perturbation reversible,
we propose to apply perturbation keys as the seeds of a generator of pseudo-randomness and
replace any randomness involved in conventional data perturbation mechanisms with such
pseudo-randomness so that the same keys, upon being released by the designed system, could
be used by the recipients of self-emerging data to reverse the perturbation process and reduce
the perturbation level. In both the two following sections, we first introduce the relevant
concepts and then present details of using perturbation keys to develop privacy-preserving
data perturbation mechanisms that support the cost-effective approach of gradually releasing
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data from the designed system. Finally, we experimental evaluate the designed approaches.
6.2 GRADUAL RELEASE OF ASSOCIATION DATA
In this section, we present details of gradually releasing association data from the designed
systems using perturbation keys. Private association data is usually published via privacy-
preserving data perturbation schemes, where the raw data is perturbed to meet the privacy
requirements before the data is published. However, conventional privacy-preserving data
perturbation schemes have focused on publishing a single snapshot of a dataset that offers a
fixed privacy level, thus failing to support the gradual release of private data [49, 54, 71, 73].
In order to applying the cost-effective approach to the gradual release of association data, we
develop a set of techniques of multi-level reversible association data perturbation that use
perturbation keys to control the sequential generation of multiple snapshots of the perturbed
data to offer multi-level access based on privacy levels, thus allowing only the perturbation
keys to be sent into the self-emerging data release system and only a single snapshot of
perturbed dataset to be maintained. Extensive experiments on real association dataset show
that our techniques are efficient and scalable.
6.2.1 Overview of Concepts and Models
In this subsection, we first model bipartite association graphs and introduce the definitions
of differential privacy. We then model the multilevel reversible association data privacy.
Bipartite Association Graph Model: Private data in real world often arises in the form
of associations between entities such as the drugs purchased by patients in a pharmacy store
or the movies rated by viewers in a movie rating database or the products purchased by
buyers in an online shopping website [33, 63, 65]. Such associations are best captured as
bipartite association graphs with nodes representing the entities (e.g., drugs and patients)
and the edges correspond to the associations between them (e.g., Patient Bob purchased the
Insulin drug). A bipartite graph can be represented as BG = (V,W,E), which consists of
m = |V | nodes of a first type, n = |W | of a second type and a set of edges E ⊆ V ×W .
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Thus, a bipartite graph can represent a set of two-node pairings, where a two-node pairing
(a, b) represents an edge between node a ∈ V and node b ∈ W .
Differential privacy: Differential privacy [49] is a state-of-the-art privacy paradigm that
makes conservative assumptions about the adversary’s background knowledge and protects
a single individual’s information in a dataset by considering adjacent datasets which differ
only in one record. The conventional (individual) differential privacy protects the inference
of a single individual’s information in a dataset. For example, in a bipartite graph represent-
ing the associations between drugs and patients, such a single individual’s protection may
correspond to the inference of the graph edge representing a patient (e.g., ‘Alice’) purchas-
ing a drug (e.g.,‘Citalo’). For the purpose of protecting sensitive information of a group of
individuals (e.g., the total number of cancer medicines purchased by patients in a specific
neighborhood), differential privacy can be further extended to support group data protection
based on the notion of group differential privacy [105]. Group differential privacy protects
sensitive aggregate information about groups of records using higher noise injection and
perturbation. When records of a dataset are grouped into larger groups, the transformed
dataset will provide coarser aggregate information and the privacy offered by group differ-
ential privacy will be stronger. Therefore, by grouping the records of a dataset into multiple
granularity levels, different privacy levels can be offered by implementing group differential
privacy at different granularity levels in the dataset. In this section, we employ both in-
dividual and group differential privacy to provide multi-level disclosure of the association
data using a single instance of the perturbed dataset. For more details about individual and
group differential privacy, please refer to [105].
Multilevel reversible association data privacy: We would like techniques developed in
this section to support the multi-level reversible association data privacy, which can be viewed
as a sequence of permutation and noise injection steps. Figure 25 illustrates the process with
an example bipartite graph where the original bipartite graph is shown as snapshot S0, which
consists of eight left (patient) nodes denoted by PID, eight right (medicine) nodes denoted
by MID and eleven edges representing which medicine was purchased by which patient. To
protect group differential privacy, the bipartite graph is first partitioned into multiple levels
of subgraphs representing different granularity levels based on a taxonomy tree or some
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Figure 25: Multilevel reversible association data privacy
granular subgraph generation techniques such as the one presented in [105]. In the example
of Figure 25 , at level L2×2, both the left and right nodes are grouped into groups of two
nodes and thus it generates sixteen subgraphs. Similarly, at level L4×4 and level L8×8, nodes
are grouped into four subgraphs and a single graph, respectively. Based on the partitioning,
dataset owners (i.e., senders of self-emerging data) can choose to make a lightly perturbed
snapshot, S1 at L2×2, a moderately perturbed snapshot, S2 at L4×4 and a heavily perturbed
snapshot, S3 at L8×8. To generate each perturbed snapshot mentioned above, we propose
to implement one step of (node) permutation followed by one step of (edge) perturbation.
The purpose of node permutation is to ensure information generalization. For example, at
snapshot S0, left nodes P2, P3 and right nodes M7, M3 form a subgraph contained by L2×2,
which has a single edge (P2,M3). Without node permutation, specific information in S0, such
as the edge (P2,M3) that indicates P2 purchased M3, can be viewed by users who only have
privilege to view S1 to learn generalized information about subgraphs at L2×2. In contrast,
by permuting P2, P3 and also by permuting M7, M3 within their size-two groups, the label
M3 is swapped with M7. Thus, instead of edge (P2,M3), a fake edge (P2,M7) indicating
incorrect specific information is contained in S1, whereas generalized information about the
subgraph is still maintained in S1. This process is followed by the edge perturbation process
which aims to prevent specific information to be inferred from the generalized information in
the exposed snapshot. For example, after node shuﬄing, the subgraph between P2, P3 and
M3, M7 shows generalized information that one patient between P2 and P3 has purchased one
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medicine between M3 and M7. It has four possibilities, namely (P2,M3), (P2,M7), (P3,M3)
and (P3,M7). An adversary with some background knowledge may infer that (P2,M7),
(P3,M3) and (P3,M7) cannot exist and therefore will be able to conclude the existence of
edge (P2,M3) from the generalized information. To address this concern, edge perturbation
can be used to perturb the edges of each subgraph based on randomized differential privacy
mechanisms (e.g., Laplace Mechanism [49]). In the example, users receiving S1 can also
view the injected edge (P3,M3) guaranteeing differential privacy, thus feeling uncertain to
conclude the existence of (P2,M3). After the two steps, S1 can be generated, which reveals
generalized information about subgraphs at L2×2 while protecting individual information in
S0. Similarly, S2 and S3 reveal L4×4 information while protecting specific information of
L2×2 and L8×8 information while protecting information of L4×4, respectively. At the end of
the encoding phase, if S3 still contains sensitive information about L8×8 that the data owner
is not willing to share to all possible users, edge permutation can be executed over S3 to
permute all the edges in S3 so that the obtained S4 is safe for disclosure.
6.2.2 Reversible association data perturbation
To generate snapshot Si from Si−1 as shown in Figure 25, a perturbation key is used to first
pseudo-randomly permute the two sides of nodes of each subgraph and then pseudo-randomly
perturb edges within each subgraph. Also, edge permutation at the last step can be pseudo-
randomly implemented using a perturbation key. Next, we show how to use perturbation keys
to perform edge perturbation, node permutation and edge permutation so that legitimate
users (i.e., recipients of self-emerging data) can use perturbation keys to reverse S4 to any
previous snapshots (e.g., S0, S1, S2, S3) containing finer information. The pseudo-codes of
edge perturbation, node permutation and edge permutation are presented in Appendix C.
Reversible edge perturbation: For each subgraph, the reversible edge perturbation step
first uses the perturbation key to pseudo-randomly sample a noise using the Laplace Mecha-
nism [49]. Specifically, during noise injection, the number of injected edges is sampled from
Laplace pseudo-random value generator with mean 0, variance 4f/ and seed K, where
4f and  denote the sensitivity and budget of Laplace Mechanism [49] and K refers to
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the perturbation key. After this process, legitimate users can receive the perturbation key
to reversibly remove the injected noise. With the same seed K, same n can be generated,
which can then select and remove the same sequence of edges.
Reversible node permutation: For each subgraph, the reversible node permutation step
uses the perturbation key to pseudo-randomly shuﬄe node labels (e.g., PID, MID) during
the encoding phase and later uses the same key to recover their order during the decoding
process. During the encoding phase, the perturbation key is used as a seed of the pseudo-
random stream generator to generate a sequence of pseudo-random numbers, which is then
used to shuﬄe the left nodes and right notes of the subgraph. Specifically, each pseudo-
random number swaps two left (right) nodes. The first node between the two is selected from
top to bottom along with its position while the second node is pseudo-randomly selected by
the pseudo-random number using modular arithmetic. At the end of encoding phase, both
left nodes and right nodes have been shuﬄed in a reversible manner. Later, during decoding
phase, given the same key, the same sequence of pseudo-random numbers can be obtained to
recover left nodes and right nodes of the subgraph. Instead of starting from top to bottom,
the decoding process starts from bottom to top with a reverse order so that operations
implemented during encoding can be reversibly implemented during decoding, which results
in the recovery of the original subgraph. In Figure 26, the labels of the nodes are permuted
through reversible node permutation while the edges are permuted through reversible edge
permutation (to be discussed later). In the example, Alice uses a perturbation key as a seed
to the pseudo-random stream generator to get a sequence of pseudo-random numbers R,
where the first six pseudo-random numbers (assumed to be [35, 18, 46, 12, 27, 57]) and second
six pseudo-random numbers (assumed to be [7, 18, 24, 29, 62, 67]) in R are used to shuﬄe
the left and right nodes of the bipartite graph respectively. Then, the first pseudo-random
number R1 = 35 swaps P2 and P3, followed by 18 swapping P3 and P6, 46 swapping P4 and
P5, 12 swapping P6 and P5, 27 swapping P4 and P6, 57 swapping P2 and P4. As a result,
left nodes in the left bipartite graph are permuted to the order in the right bipartite graph.
Later, in Figure 27, Bob gets the permutation key from Alice and uses the key as a seed and
generates the same R as generated by Alice. Among the first six pseudo-random numbers
[35, 18, 46, 12, 27, 57], R6 = 57 is first picked to swap P2 and P4, followed by 27 swapping P4
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Figure 26: Encoding Figure 27: Decoding
and P6, 12 to swapping P6 and so on. Therefore, the original order of the left nodes can be
recovered.
Reversible edge permutation: Edge permutation is implemented as the last step in the
encoding phase and therefore it represents the first step during the decoding phase. The
edges of the bipartite graph are represented using an adjacency matrix. For example, the
adjacency matrix of the left bipartite graph in Figure 26 is shown as the matrix E below,
where the first row represents that P2 is linked with M1. Here, the edges can be shuﬄed by
simply permuting the adjacency matrix.
E =

0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
 E =

1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 0 0

Similar to node permutation, in both the encoding and decoding phase, the same se-
quence of pseudo-random numbers can be obtained through the same perturbation key. Then,
given the adjacency matrix of size |V ||W |, we use the first |V ||W | pseudo-random numbers
to perform |V ||W | rounds of swap operation. Each time, the first edge is selected based on
a fixed order (top to bottom and left to right during encoding phase, right to left and bot-
tom to top during decoding phase) and the second edge is pseudo-randomly selected by the
pseudo-random number using modular arithmetic. In this way, by reversibly performing the
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swap operation during the decoding phase, the original order of the edges can be recovered.
In Figure 26, if the first and second pseudo-random numbers generated by a key are 53 and
71, we first use 53 to swap E[b0
6
c][0 mod 6] = E[0][0] and E[b53 mod 36
6
c][(53 mod 36) mod
6] = E[2][5]. Then, we use 71 to swap E[0][1] and E[5][5]. By repeating this for all the 36
pseudo-random numbers, the adjacency matrix can be transformed as E to represent the
right bipartite graph in Figure 26.
6.2.3 Experimental Evaluation
In this subsection, we present the experimental study on the performance of the proposed
reversible data perturbation techniques. We first briefly describe the experimental setup.
Experimental setup: Our experiment setup was implemented in Java with an Intel Core
i7 2.70GHz 16GB RAM PC. The bipartite graph dataset used in this work is the Movie-
Lens dataset [63] which consists of 6,040 users (left nodes), 3,706 movies (right nodes) and
1,000,209 edges describing rating of movies made by users.
Experimental results: The experimental results are organized into two parts. First, we
evaluate the performance efficiency of the three key components of the reversible perturba-
tion process separately, namely edge perturbation, node permutation and edge permutation.
Then, we integrate the three components and evaluate the performance of the complete re-
versible data perturbation process. In our experiments, we generate three granularity levels
and evaluate the time and space consumption for each granularity level during encoding and
decoding phases.
The first set of experiments evaluates the performance efficiency of edge perturbation,
node permutation and edge permutation separately. We evaluate the scalability of these
algorithms by varying the size of dataset and we measure the time taken for their execution
both in encoding and decoding phases. In Figure 28(a), edge perturbation is evaluated.
The dataset size is changed from one thousand edges to one million edges. Specifically, the
one-million-edge dataset represents the entire MovieLens dataset. The results show that
both noise injection (encode) and removal (decode) processes have significantly low time
consumption cost and demonstrate high scalability. Even when the dataset size increases
1000 times, the time consumption increases only by a factor of 2. For a dataset with one
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Figure 28: Algorithm performance
million edges, the noise injection and removal processes cost only about 35ms and 10ms
respectively. Here, compared with noise injection, the noise removal process usually has a
lower time consumption. This is because the process of noise removal employs some meta
data information attached to the perturbed dataset which significantly accelerates its speed
of execution. Next, in Figure 28(b), we evaluate the node permutation process with the
same experiment setting. Unlike edge perturbation, although the time consumption of node
permutation is significantly small for small datasets, it becomes acceptably larger for the
one-million-edge dataset, which is about 14s. Finally, in Figure 28(c), we measure the time
taken by the edge permutation process using dataset sizes that vary from 0.2 million edges to
1 million edges. The results show that the time taken by the process for the one-million-edge
dataset is about 23s, which is quite acceptable as the edge shuﬄing process is only required
to be run once during the entire process.
The second set of experiments evaluates the performance of the multiple levels of per-
turbation during the process. In this part, we processed the dataset to generate three gran-
ularity levels of subgraphs, denoted as L1, L2 and L3 respectively. We applied the DiffPar
partitioning algorithm [105] to generate the granularity levels. The algorithm runs several
rounds of specializations and each specialization can partition a bipartite graph into four
non-overlapping subgraphs. Therefore, after n rounds of specializations, the original bipar-
tite graph has been partitioned to 4n non-overlapped subgraphs. In this experiment, we use
the MovieLens dataset and we consider the entire graph as level L1, the 16 (4
2) subgraphs
generated by two specializations as level L2 and the 256 (4
4) subgraphs generated by four
specializations as level L3. For ease of understanding, L1, L2 and L3 can be considered to
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Figure 29: Multi-level performance
roughly correspond with L8×8, L4×4 and L2×2 in the example of Figure 25. In Figure 29(a),
we evaluate the encoding and decoding time for each granularity level when the dataset
size is varied from 0.2 million edges to 1 million edges. As can be seen, as the dataset size
increases, the time taken by all the three granularity levels also show a reasonable increase.
Level L3 needs to run edge perturbation and node permutation over the 256 subgraphs. Due
to the very small subgraph size and the low sensitivity for protecting differential privacy for
individual edges, L3 has the lowest time consumption. At level L2, although the number of
subgraphs reduces to 16, the corresponding increase in subgraph size makes its time con-
sumption higher than that of L3 for large dataset size. Finally, the time consumption of level
L1 is dominated by edge permutation, which follows the same trend as shown in Figure 28(c).
In Figure 29(b), we fix the dataset size as one million edges while changing the number of
subgraphs at level L2 from 16 to 4 and 64. This change at L2, as shown in Figure 29(b),
has no influence on the results of L3. The reduction from 16 to 4 makes an increase for
both L2 and L1 while the increase from 16 to 64 makes results at L2 significantly increased
and results at L1 obviously decreased. These results show that instead of the average size
of subgraphs, the time consumptions of granularity levels are much more sensitive to the
amount of the injected noises. Finally, in Figure 29(c), we compare the storage cost required
by conventional framework and reversible framework. Based on Figure 25, three granularity
levels can generate at most five snapshots. As can be seen, using the conventional framework,
the storage cost is linearly increased with the number of generated snapshots as data owner
needs to store all of them. However, the proposed reversible framework efficiently employs
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the use of perturbation keys to allow all snapshots to be recovered from a single published
snapshot protected with the highest privacy level. Thus, the data owner only needs to store
one snapshot. The size of the perturbation keys and the stored metadata for noise injection
have little influence on the overall storage cost.
6.3 GRADUAL RELEASE OF LOCATION DATA
In this section, we present details of gradually releasing location data using perturbation
keys. Location anonymization refers to the process of perturbing the exact location of users
as a spatially cloaked region such that a user’s location becomes indistinguishable from the
location of a set of other users. However, conventional location anonymization techniques [36,
37, 66] are developed as unidirectional and irreversible techniques which fail to support the
cost-effective gradual release of privacy data shown in Figure 24. Therefore, we present
ReverseCloak, a new class of reversible spatial cloaking mechanisms that effectively provides
multi-level location privacy protection, allowing de-anonymization of the cloaking region
when corresponding perturbation keys are released to the data users in future through the
self-emerging data release system. Extensive experiments on real road networks show that
our techniques are efficient and scalable.
6.3.1 Overview of Concepts and Models
In this subsection, we first describe the road network model used to capture the mobility fea-
tures of mobile users [41, 80, 125]. Then, we present the concept of location anonymization.
Finally, we define the multilevel reversible location privacy problem.
Road network model: We model the road network as a graph G = (νG, εG), where
νG represents the set of junctions and εG represents the set of road segments. A junction is
defined as the crossover point of any two roads or the end of a road segment. A road segment
is defined as the direct road connecting any two adjacent junctions. Each segment is uniquely
determined by the two junctions associated with it while each junction is associated with
105
one or more adjacent road segments. In the road network, each mobile user is assumed to
move along the segments and change direction only at junctions. A user may send her true
location information with the anonymization requirements to a trusted anonymization server
which then transforms this raw location information into a cloaking region that meets the
required privacy levels.
Location anonymization: We consider two kinds of privacy requirements arising in a road
network namely location k-anonymity and segment l-diversity. The k-anonymity requirement
ensures that the exposed location of a user indistinguishable from the location information
of at least k − 1 other users. However, satisfying location k-anonymity alone may not be
sufficient to protect the location privacy of the user in cases when there are homogeneity
attacks [89]. For instance, if all the k users contained in a k-anonymized spatial region
are present in a single physical location, such as a hospital, then even though there are
k users in the cloaked region, an adversary observing the region can still infer the actual
location of the subject with high certainty. To protect against such scenarios, the notion
of location l-diversity has been introduced [86, 89]. A cloaked location satisfies segment l-
diversity [125] if the cloaked region not only includes k distinct users but also contains l well
represented road segments. Therefore, from an attacker’s perspective, a cloaking area with
more segments increases the difficulty to track a user and hence ensuring a larger l-diversity
provides higher location privacy. In a personalized location privacy model, for each location
anonymization request, the level of k-anonymity, δk, and l-diversity, δl, are given by the user
in a customizable manner. These two parameters together decide the anonymization level. In
addition, in order to maintain the QoS above a certain level, user needs to set anonymization
restrictions to cloaking spatial area, namely the spatial tolerance σs, indicating the maximum
acceptable cloaking spatial area.
Multilevel reversible location privacy: We would like techniques developed in this
section to support multi-level location privacy in data gradual release scenarios. In such cases,
the location privacy of users is protected under multiple privacy levels, with higher anonymity
levels to be maintained in recent future and lower privacy levels to be maintained in remote
future. In the multi-level reversible location privacy framework, a trusted anonymizer obtains
the raw location information from the mobile clients with the user-defined profile. With
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Figure 30: Multilevel reversible location anonymization
the multi-level privacy model, the user-defined profile consists of the privacy requirements
for each privacy level, Li, except L0 referring to a cloaking region with only the segment
of actual user. Accordingly, the user-defined privacy profile is represented by (δik, δ
i
l), where
1 ≤ i ≤ N−1 and N denotes the number of privacy levels. In addition, each privacy level, Li
is associated with a shared perturbation key, Keyi, which is used to drive the anonymization
process for that privacy level. Therefore, with access to the perturbation key of a particular
privacy level, users of the cloaked location can selectively de-anonymize the cloaked region
to reduce privacy levels to obtain finer location information. A detailed example of a four
level case is shown in Figure 30. The segment s4 contains the actual user of level, L
0. Using
the perturbation key Key1, s6 is added to reach the privacy level, δ
1
k, δ
1
l of L
1. Then, Key2
is used further to extend the cloaking region to meet δ2k, δ
2
l of level L
2 by adding segments
{s3, s5}. Finally, {s1, s2, s7, s8} are added using the perturbation key, Key3 to reach the
highest privacy level, L3. Based on the cost-effective gradual release approach described in
Figure 24, the keys should be sent into the decentralized self-emerging data release system
while only the largest cloaking region {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7, s8} need to be stored in cloud.
Later, when the cloaked location information needs to be reduced in privacy levels, it can
be done using the perturbation keys. For instance, for accessing the information at the
lower privilege level, L2, Key3 can be used to exactly identify and remove the segments
{s1, s2, s7, s8} from the cloaking region to reduce to the cloaked region corresponding to
level, L2. Similarly, using both Key3 and Key2, the segments {s1, s2, s7, s8, s3, s5} can be
identified and removed from the cloaking region to reduce to level, L1. Therefore, by merely
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managing the shared perturbation keys among the location users at different privilege levels,
the whole process protects location privacy under multiple discrete levels as customized in
the user-defined privacy profile.
6.3.2 Reversible Location Cloaking
In this subsection, we present the proposed ReverseCloak mechanisms that support multi-
level location cloaking over road networks. We propose two algorithms, namely reversible
global expansion (RGE) and reversible pre-assignment-based local expansion (RPLE). The
pseudo-codes of the two algorithms are presented in Appendix D.
Figure 31: Reversible global expansion
Figure 32: Reversible pre-assignment-
based local expansion
In reversible location cloaking, the anonymization and de-anonymization processes are
considered as a continuous selection and removal of road segments on the geographic road
map respectively. To ensure that the process is reversible, the segments are selected in a
pseudo-random manner. Each road segment on the map is linked to several other segments,
which are located close to it. Once a road segment S is selected during anonymization, the
next selected road segment is from one of its linked segments. With a certain perturbation
key, a fixed segment S ′ among them is deterministically selected. However, without the
perturbation key, all its linked segments would have the same probability to be selected, thus
making the selection process pseudo-random and making it impossible to reverse without
possessing the perturbation key. Then, during the de-anonymization process, the newly
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selected segment S ′ maps to the previous road segment S using the perturbation key. The
algorithms checks which road segment is linked with S ′ to narrow down the options and
whether segment S ′ can be deterministically selected with the perturbation key if we assume
a segment is S. A key challenge here is the ‘collision’ issue that could happen in the de-
anonymization process. That is, we may find multiple road segments that meet the conditions
to be the candidate of the previously chosen road segment. To address this issue, in RGE, for
each road segment selection during anonymization, the links of previously selected segments
are rebuilt on the fly to avoid collisions and optimize the selection based on the current
state. In RPLE, prior to the anonymization process, all the road segments in the map are
pre-assigned their links in a collision-free manner. As a result, RGE has larger anonymization
runtime to build collision-free links on the fly but smaller memory requirement while RPLE
has smaller anonymization runtime but requires larger memory space to store the collision-
free links. Next, we review the process of RGE and RPLE with Figure 31 and Figure 32,
respectively.
In both Figure 31 and Figure 32, the current cloaking region is {s8, s9, s11}, where s8 is
the last selected segment, and the algorithms are selecting the next segment to be added into
the cloaking region. In RGE (Figure 31), the three selected segments {s8, s9, s11} and the
same number of non-selected nearby segments {s6, s10, s14} are taken to form a 3x3 square
matrix, where the cells are filled with 0-2 in a way that each row/column has no repeated
value. Assume that the pseudo-random number Ri generated through the perturbation key
gives Ri mod 3 = 2, then s14 will be the next selected segment because only the cell [s8][s14]
has value 2 at row s8. Later in de-anonymization, after removing s14, the same matrix can
be formed and the same perturbation key can give Ri mod 3 = 2. By looking at column s14,
since only the cell [s8][s14] has value 2, the algorithm understands that s8 should be the next
removed segment. In this way, the reversibility can be established in a collision-free manner.
Unlike RGE, in RPLE (Figure 32), prior to the anonymization process, the algorithm has
generated one forward list and one backward list for each segment in the map. All the
lists have the same length, which is six in the example. Assume that the pseudo-random
number Ri gives Ri mod 6 = 3, then s14 will be the next selected segment because it is the
third element in the forward list of s8. Later in de-anonymization, since s8 is also the third
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Figure 33: Performance with Varying Anonymity Level
element in the backward list of s14, with the same perturbation key giving Ri mod 6 = 3,
the algorithm is able to remove s8 after s14. As can be seen, to establish reversibility in
RPLE, s14 should be at the same position in the forward list of s8 where s8 is located in the
backward list of s14. With this objective, in RPLE, the two lists for all the road segments
can be generated in a greedy manner.
6.3.3 Experimental Evaluation
In this subsection, we first present the experimental setup, and then evaluate the perfor-
mance of proposed reversible global expansion and pre-assignment-based location expansion
algorithms, compared with several existing cloaking algorithms.
Experimental setup: To simulate different anonymization schemes, we use GTMobiSim
mobile trace generator for road network [107]. Our experiments were designed based on
a real road network map of northwest part of Atlanta, involving 6979 junctions and 9187
segments, obtained from maps of National Mapping Division of the USGS. There are 10,000
cars randomly generated along the roads based on Gaussian distribution. Once a car is
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generated, the associated destination is also randomly chosen and the route selection is
based on shortest path routing. In our experiments, four different anonymization schemes
are implemented: Random Sampling (RS), Star-based road-network expansion(SE) [125],
a candidate representative of existing road network-based expansion schemes, Reversible
Global Expansion(RGE) and Reversible Pre-assignment-based Local Expansion(RPLE). The
first two algorithms (RS and SE) are irreversible while the two algorithms proposed in this
section (RGE and RPLE) are reversible support multi-level privacy control. All the schemes
are implemented in Java with the help of GTMobiSim.
Experimental results: We evaluates the performance of the algorithms by varying the
anonymity level δk as δk = 10i for i = 1, 2...10. Here, the spatial tolerance, σs, is set as a
function of the anonymity level, δk such that σs = 400
√
i for i = 1, 2...10, where the unit is
meter. Therefore, the maximum allowable special region is a circular region with the user’s
actual location as the center and the spatial tolerance, σs as the radius. we also set 5%
standard deviation for each σs and the segment diversity level δl is fixed to be 10. For this
experiment, we consider only one privacy level and for the multi-level reversible techniques,
this privacy requirement represents the privacy level of the least privileged user.
We compare the average anonymization time for the various approaches in Figure 33(a).
In Figure 33(a), we find that RPLE is fastest in the anonymization phase among all the
compared techniques. The reason is that the assignment of transition values in the RPLE
scheme has been done apriori and at the time location cloaking, the transition graph is
directly looked up as compared to dynamically computing it on the fly in the RGE approach.
Also, for all the algorithms, the anonymization time is longer for larger δk as stricter privacy
requirements result in cloaking areas with more segments and it therefore requires addition
of more segments into the cloaking area.
Figure 33(b) shows the impact of varying δk on the de-anonymization time. Since only
reversible algorithms can perform de-anonymization of the cloaked region, RS and SE are
not considered for this experiment. For both RGE and RPLE, the variation trends of de-
anonymization time are similar as the anonymization time in Figure 33(a) as the computa-
tional complexity of the de-anonymization process is similar to that of the anonymization
process. In both anonymization and de-anonymization phases, RPLE is faster than RGE
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because RPLE prevents collision in a apriori manner through its intelligent pre-assignment
of forward and backward transitions while RGE prevents collision by dynamically assigning
the transition values during location cloaking.
Figure 33(c) displays the impact of changing the anonymity level, δk on relative spatial
resolution (RSR) which is defined the ratio of the size of the obtained cloaking area to size of
the maximum allowable spatial area, specified by the spatial tolerance level, d. Here, RS has
the lowest relative spatial resolution (RSR) as its candidate expansion region covers all the
segments within the maximum allowable spatial area, thus making the size of the cloaking
area close to the maximum spatial area even when δk is small. we also find that the relative
spatial resolution of SE and RGE is larger than RPLE as the cloaking segments in SE and
RGE are selected from a global neighboring segment set, providing a tighter structure as
compared to a local neighboring set in the RPLE approach.
In Figure 33(d), we compare the success rate of the anonymization process with varying
δk value. The success rate represents the fraction of the cases where the cloaking algorithm
is able to provide a cloaking region meeting the privacy requirements in terms of δk and
δl. we find that all the algorithms have a high success rate indicating that most of the
anonymization requests are cloaked successfully to meet the privacy requirements. we also
find that for all the schemes, the success rate decreases slowly when δk becomes very large.
This is because a larger δk requires a larger cloaking area, which is harder to be satisfied
by a given spatial tolerance. However, we note that even for higher anonymity levels, such
as δk = 100, the success rates of both RGE and RPLE are higher and are close to 90%.
RS keeps the highest success rate here as its failure occurs only when the total number of
users within the maximum spatial area is smaller than δk. In fact, the success rate of the RS
scheme defines the theoretical maximum success rate of the cloaking process for the given
anonymization requests. we also note that SE and RGE have slightly higher success rate
than RPLE as their cloaking regions have higher density and smaller size, thus being easier
to meet the spatial tolerance requirement.
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6.4 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In this chapter, we propose the cost-effective approach for gradual release of self-emerging
data that allows the perturbation level of private data to be gradually reduced over time by
using the decentralized self-emerging data release system. We propose two representative ap-
plications that use the proposed cost-effective approach to gradually release association data
and location data, respectively. For each of them, we present the adopted privacy paradigms
and also develop a set of reversible perturbation techniques used for generating multiple
reversible snapshots of the private data through perturbation keys. Extensive experiments
show that the proposed techniques are effective and efficient.
So far, we have comprehensively discussed all the three research components (i.e., Infras-
tructure, Output, Input) and have resolved all the research tasks proposed in Section 1.1. In
the next chapter, we will conclude this dissertation and present possible future directions.
113
7.0 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
7.1 CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, we study new decentralized designs of self-emerging data release systems
using large-scale peer-to-peer (P2P) networks as the underlying infrastructure. The first part
of the dissertation presents the design of decentralized self-emerging data release systems
using two different P2P network infrastructures, namely Distributed Hash Table (DHT) and
blockchain. Specifically, our system designed in Chapter 3 leverages the efficient lookup
service of DHT to establish a suite of routing path construction schemes for securely storing
and routing the self-emerging data in DHT networks before a prescribed data release time.
It demonstrates that increasing data redundancy is an effective approach of concealing data
in the highly dynamic DHT network and protect the data from being stolen by adversaries.
However, due to the lack of ways of enforcing behaviors performed by the peers in DHT, the
DHT-based system usually needs complex routing paths constructed by hundreds of nodes
to offer sufficient data redundancy, which may result in an unacceptable cost. To resolve
this issue, our system designed in Chapter 4 leverages the decentralized trust and the native
cryptocurrency offered by blockchain to enforce peers to honestly follow their agreements
through cryptocurrency-driven monetary incentive and penalty. With the assumption that
all peers are rational, the protocols carefully designed through game theory in Chapter 4
can make rational nodes choose to honestly comply with the protocols, instead of tending
to perform any misbehavior violating the protocols, as such misbehaviors will make their
deposit get confiscated.
The second part of this dissertation proposes new mechanisms for supporting two func-
tionalities of self-emerging data release, namely supporting the release of self-emerging data
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to smart contracts and supporting the cost-effective gradual release of self-emerging data.
The mechanism proposed in Chapter 5 enables releasing self-emerging data to smart con-
tracts, thus facilitating a wide range of decentralized applications, allowing users of decen-
tralized applications to schedule functions of smart contracts to be executed automatically at
future points of time, without revealing the private input data before the expected function
execution time. In Chapter 6, we analyze possible options of inputting the self-emerging data
to the designed system and propose a cost-effective approach of using perturbation keys to
gradually release self-emerging data over time. We develop a suite of mechanisms supporting
cost-effective gradual release and demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed mechanisms
in two representative scenarios of gradually releasing self-emerging data, namely location
data disclosure and association data disclosure.
7.2 FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We believe that the outcome of this dissertation would contribute to the development of
decentralized security primitives and protocols in the context of timed release of private
data. Next, we provide a brief list of possible future directions for our work.
• The protocols proposed in this dissertation are designed for making the self-emerging
data get released at a release time prescribed by the data sender. In some cases, it may
be hard for the data sender to clearly identify the expected release time. Instead, it may
be desirable to release the data when a certain event happens. Therefore, one future
direction is to extend the existing time-driven data release to event-driven data release
for the purpose of increasing flexibility of releasing self-emerging data.
• In the systems designed in this dissertation, upon sending the self-emerging data out,
the data senders cannot make any change to their service requests or their data. In
some circumstances, senders may want to change their strategies of releasing their data
or change their data after the data has been passed to service providers within the P2P
network infrastructure. Therefore, additional protocols are desirable to make the systems
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support such functionalities securely. Here we list a part of possible functionalities to be
designed:
– Acceleration: Senders can make the data get released earlier than the release time.
– Deceleration: Senders can make the data get released later than the release time.
– Revocation: Senders can revoke the self-emerging data before the release time.
– Redirection: Senders can change the data recipient before the release time.
– Update: Senders can update the self-emerging data before the release time.
• In Ethereum, any transaction creating new smart contracts or calling functions of exist-
ing smart contracts will spend gas, namely spending real money. As a result, services
established over Ethereum is highly sensitive regarding gas cost because expensive ser-
vices are hard to be widely accepted by users in practice. In the blockchain-based systems
designed in this dissertation, we have paid attention to the gas consumption and have
required only the hash values to be saved in the blockchain in most cases, so the gas
cost corresponding to a specific service request is mainly relevant to the number of in-
volved service providers. However, the proposed protocols do not differentiate old service
providers from new service providers, failing to utilize the past performance of service
providers for reducing service cost. Therefore, one future direction of this dissertation
could be establishing a trust management mechanism that leverages the service history
of each provider to compute a trust score and dynamically adjusts the number of involved
service providers based on their trust scores, thus being able to reduce the number of
selected service providers when most of them maintain high trust scores.
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APPENDIX A
DISTRIBUTED HASH TABLE
In this section, we introduce Distributed Hash Table (DHT) with more details. The DHT
technology refers to a class of protocols that provide lookup services for storing (key,value)
pairs in an overlay network and also for efficiently retrieving the stored value associated with
a given key. In a distributed network composing of N nodes, a straightforward approach
of mapping data to the nodes is by leveraging the hash function and modular arithmetic,
namely taking hash(file) mod N . However, in a distributed system, it is quite common
that a node may have downtime and may join and leave the network frequently. In case
of a new node joining the network, the number of nodes in the network increases from
N to N + 1, requesting the mapping between data and nodes to be re-computed through
hash(file) mod (N + 1). As a result, many files that have been stored on the previous N
node need to be relocated, resulting in significantly high traffic that may even block the
network.
Consistent hashing : To resolve the aforementioned issue, we need technique to organize the
nodes in a way that the amount of migrated data due to a single joint or left node can be
minimized. Such a technique is named consistent hashing and has been adopted by most
DHT protocols as a fundamental building block [91, 119]. As illustrated in Figure 34, with
consistent hashing, the space that the hash function can map is fixed to [0, 2n − 1] and is
organized as a ring. Each node in the network should choose a n-bit ID that has the same
length of each lookup key associated with a file, so both node IDs and lookup keys occupy the
same ring-shaped space. In the example of Figure 34, four nodes are mapped to a hash ring
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Figure 34: Consistent hashing Figure 35: Routing protocol in Chord
with a fixed size of [0, 2n− 1], partitioning the entire ring into four non-overlapped sections,
namely (A, B), (B, C), (C, D) and (D, A). Then, when data is mapped to a position of the
ring according to its n-bit lookup key, the node taking charge of storing the data should
be the one that has the closest ID to the data position in the counterclockwise direction of
the ring. For example, in Figure 34, node A is responsible for storing data falling within
the range (A, B), and node B is responsible for storing data falling within the range of
(B, C). Compared with the straightforward approach, the most significant advantage of the
consistent hashing is that a node joining or leaving the network does not affect data mapped
to the entire ring-shaped space, but only affects data allocated to a single section of the ring
as well as nodes associated with this section. For instance, if node A leaves the network, all
the data falling within the range of (A, B) should then be re-assigned to node D, which only
affects the data falling within the range of (A, B). In another example where a new node,
say node E, joins the network and locates between node A and node B, only a part of data
stored in node A needs to be transferred to node E.
Routing in DHT : In a naive routing protocol, a node receiving a lookup query first checks
the local storage. If the data is not locally stored, the node then forwards the query to its
neighboring node on the ring in the counterclockwise direction. The process will be repeated
until the data is found. With such a naive routing protocol, in the worst case, the query
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time complexity is O(N), where N denotes the network size. For example, in Figure 34,
to retrieve a lookup key K stored at node C from node D, the query has to be forwarded
through a path D → A → B → C. In order to improving the efficiency of lookup queries,
it would be necessary to request each node to maintain some routing information regarding
the mapping between lookup keys and DHT nodes. For instance, if we request node D in
Figure 34 to store the fact that ‘lookup key K is stored at node C’, then node D will be able
to directly forward a query of key K to node C. In practice, different DHT protocols may
implement the above strategy in different approaches. In this dissertation, we introduce the
routing protocol used by Chord [119]. Chord requests each node to maintain a finger table.
The entry i in the finger table of node j is the first node that succeeds or equals j + 2i. For
example, if a node has ID j = 1, then its finger table should consist of the IP addresses of
nodes associated with the following IDs: 1 + 20 = 2, 1 + 21 = 3, 1 + 22 = 5, 1 + 23 = 9 and so
forth. Then, upon receiving a query of key K, a node in Chord always forwards the query
to the node in its finger table with the closest ID to K. To describe this greedy process, we
present an example shown in Figure 35. In the beginning, node A receives a lookup query
of key K from a client and finds K is not locally stored. Node A then checks its finger table
and finds that K is larger than even the largest node ID, say node E, in its finger table, so
node A forwards the query to node E. After that, node E also finds K is not locally stored
but it then finds that K is very close to node H stored in its finger table, so node E forwards
the query to node H. Finally, node H finds the file associated with K from the local memory
and sends the file back to the client through the path H → E → A. To sum up, Chord
requests each node to maintain a finger table of degree O(logN) for the purpose of reducing
the query time complexity from O(N) to O(logN).
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APPENDIX B
BLOCKCHAIN AND SMART CONTRACT
In this section, we introduce the blockchain and smart contracts with more details. A
blockchain represents a decentralized and distributed public digital ledger that guarantees
that the records stored in it cannot be tampered without compromising a majority of nodes
in the network. It was first conceptualized by a person known as Satoshi Nakamoto in
2008 as the underlying technology of a cryptocurrency named Bitcoin [100]. Since then, the
growth of Bitcoin and the emerging follow-up cryptocurrencies have positioned blockchain
as a promising solution for creating trust in a decentralized environment.
The Blockchain technology is an elegant combination of cryptography and game theory.
It first relies on solid cryptographic techniques such as hash function, digital signature and
Merkle tree to offer the cryptocurrency with mathematically provable security, thus gath-
ering investment from its believers and placing a monetary value on the cryptocurrency.
It then leverages the monetary value of the cryptocurrency to incentivize members of the
entire P2P network to compete with each other for positions that can receive rewards of
cryptocurrency for updating the ledger on behalf of the entire network. In the Proof-of-
Work (PoW) consensus protocol of Bitcoin, members must spend computational resources
to solve a mathematical problem and only the winner can update the blockchain. As a
result, to falsify the ledger, an attacker must own a huge amount of computational power
that can defeat the sum of the power of the entire P2P network, which is extremely difficult
in practice. Besides, even if there is a strong attacker who has the power of falsifying the
ledger, using the power to gather more rewards of cryptocurrency from the mathematical
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Figure 36: Blockchain structure in Bitcoin
competition may be a better choice than attacking the blockchain. Once the attack happens,
investors will lose their confidence in the security of blockchain and the monetary value of
the cryptocurrency will significantly drop, which also reduces the value of cryptocurrency
owned by the attacker. From the perspective of game theory, this fact may make a rational
self-interested attacker choose to honestly obey the rules of a blockchain for the purpose of
pursuing higher profit.
Blockchain structure: Most blockchains follow a chain-of-block structure to organize data. In
Figure 36, we show a chain of four blocks with block IDs n−3 to n. In the Bitcoin blockchain
network, each account (i.e., a peer of the P2P network) owns a unique pair of public/private
keys and also a unique account address derived from the public key. To transfer Bitcoin
from one account to another, the sender account needs to create and broadcast a transaction
that first applies sender’s signatures of private key to claim ownership of the transferred
Bitcoin and then uses recipient’s public key to declare the ownership shift. Later when
the recipient wants to spend the received Bitcoin, he or she can easily apply the account
private key to prove the ownership. In the Bitcoin network, accounts trying to obtain
cryptocurrency rewards are called miners. Each miner keeps collecting transactions created
by other accounts and package them into the body of a block. Meanwhile, each miner keeps
computing the answer to a mathematical challenge. Once a miner obtains the answer, this
miner will generate a header for the current block, which consists of four main components:
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• Pre hash: The previous hash refers to the cryptographic hash of the header of the previous
block. For example, a miner that is producing block n should compute the hash of the
header of block n− 1. Due to the use of previous hash, the separated blocks are chained
together so that falsification of any block header on the chain becomes verifiable.
• Merkle root : Merkle root is the root of a Merkle tree that is used for efficiently ver-
ifying the integrity of any transaction packaged at the body of the block. In the ex-
ample of Figure 36, the body of block n contains eight transactions, namely T1 to
T8. Then, the hashes of the eight transactions, H1 to H8, are iteratively grouped
and hashed in a way that H12 = hash(H1|H2), H1234 = hash(H12|H34) and finally
root = hash(H1234|H5678). With Merkle root, fueled by pre-hash, falsification of any
transaction of any block becomes verifiable.
• Timestamp: Timestamp refers to the time point when the block header is generated.
• Nonce: Nonce refers to a value relevant to the difficulty of the mathematical challenge.
In Bitcoin, the average time of extending the blockchain by one new block is expected
to be ten minutes, so nonce is used to dynamically adjust the difficulty of the challenge
based on the recent computational power of the whole network for the purpose of making
the block generation time stable.
Smart contract : In the leading smart contract platform Ethereum [128], there are two types
of accounts, namely External Owned Accounts (EOAs) controlled by peers through pairs of
private/public keys and Contract Accounts (CAs) assigned to smart contracts. A peer of
Ethereum should first create an EOA with a pair of keys and then deploy smart contracts
from the EOA, resulting in the creation of CAs associated with the smart contracts. A
smart contract in Ethereum refers to a piece of program code that usually consists of mul-
tiple functions, a few parameters and perhaps some modifiers. After programming a smart
contract in a language such as Solidity [11], a peer can compile the contract to get its byte-
code and Application Binary Interface (ABI ) and can send a contract creation transaction
to the Ethereum network with bytecode and (optional) ABI. Upon receiving the transaction,
miners will include the bytecode into the next block, meaning that a new smart contract has
been created, whose CA can be deterministically computed from the address of its creator
and a nonce. Each CA can be viewed as a small decentralized server that can act based on
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the functions in its contract and can store data (e.g., cryptocurrency) allowed by its con-
tract. However, CAs are passive, meaning that execution of any function of deployed smart
contracts must be invoked through either transactions sent by EOAs or messages sent from
CAs. As a result, the transactions/messages, as well as function inputs inside them, are all
recorded by the Ethereum blockchain, which makes the function outputs deterministic be-
cause all miners can execute the function with the same inputs and gets the same outputs. It
is worth noting that a peer needs to pay Gas [128] for either deploying a new smart contract
or calling a function of existing smart contracts in Ethereum. Gas can be exchanged with
Ether, the cryptocurrency used in Ethereum, and Ether can be exchanged with real money.
contract be t t i ng {
function depos i t ( ) payable public part i c ipantOnly ;
function r e v e a l ( ) public part i c ipantOnly ;
function r e a s s i g n ( ) public part i c ipantOnly ;
}
Algorithm B.1: A simplified betting contract
We now illustrate smart contracts with a simplified betting contract presented in Algo-
rithm B.1, where Alice and Bob decide to bet on a topic with cryptocurrency they have. The
betting contract consists of three functions. Alice and Bob can first make deposits (i.e., the
cryptocurrency Ether) to the contract (i.e., CA of the betting contract) through deposit(),
then invoke reveal() after a certain temporal threshold to reveal the result and finally reassign
the cryptocurrency locked in the contract based on the result by calling reassign().
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APPENDIX C
REVERSIBLE ASSOCIATION DATA PERTURBATION
In this section, we present the pseudo-codes of the algorithms proposed for the reversible
association data perturbation, including the pseudo-codes of reversible edge perturbation,
reversible node permutation and reversible edge permutation.
C.1 REVERSIBLE EDGE PERTURBATION
Algorithm 5: Noise injection
Input : Bipartite graph BG = (V,W,E), sensitivity 4f , budget , key K.
Output: Perturbed bipartite graph B˜G.
1 n = bLaplaceRandom(0,4f/,K)c;
2 Initialize counter c = 0, index i = 0, new edge recorder NE, skipped index recorder SI;
3 while c < n do
4 ne = (rand(2i,K) mod |V |, rand(2i+ 1,K) mod |W |);
5 if ne /∈ E ∪NE then
6 NE ← ne; c+ +;
7 end
8 else
9 SI ← i;
10 end
11 i++;
12 end
13 B˜G = (V,W,E ∪NE);
When the sampled noise is positive, the procedures of noise injection and noise removal
are performed as shown in Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6 respectively. During each loop (line
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Algorithm 6: Noise removal
Input : Perturbed bipartite graph B˜G, sensitivity 4f , budget , key K, skipped index recorder SI.
Output: Bipartite graph BG.
1 n = bLaplaceRandom(0,4f/,K)c;
2 Initialize index i = 0;
3 while i < n+ |SI| && i /∈ SI do
4 re = (rand(2i,K) mod |V |, rand(2i+ 1,K) mod |W |);
5 Remove edge re from B˜G;
6 i++;
7 end
8 BG = B˜G;
3-12), two pseudo-random numbers are used to select one left node and one right node from
the subgraph to form a new edge ne (line 4). If ne is not an existing edge, its selection will
be confirmed (line 5-7); otherwise, this iteration will be skipped to avoid collision and this
skipped index will be recorded into a list that will be attached with the key to be used during
the decoding process later (line 8-10). The algorithm complexity is O(n). Later in noise
removal, with the same seed K, same n can be generated (line 1), which can then select and
remove the same sequence of edges with assistance of SI (line 3-7). The complexity of this
algorithm is O(n+ |SI|). However, when noises are negative, instead of using |SI| to record
the skipped iterations, we need to record all removed edges using the perturbation key.
C.2 REVERSIBLE NODE PERMUTATION
Algorithm 7: Node permutation: encoding
Input : Bipartite graph BG = (V,W,E), key K.
Output: Permuted bipartite graph BG.
1 R = PseudoRandom(K);
2 for i = 0; i < |V |; i+ + do
3 Swap node V [i] and node V [R[i] mod |V |];
4 end
5 for i = |V |; i < |V |+ |W |; i+ + do
6 Swap node W [i− |V |] and node W [R[i] mod |W |];
7 end
We show the encoding phase and decoding phase in Algorithm 7 and Algorithm 8 respec-
tively. During the encoding phase, the perturbation key is used as a seed to generate a se-
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Algorithm 8: Node permutation: decoding
Input : Permuted bipartite graph BG = (V,W,E), key K.
Output: Bipartite graph BG.
1 R = PseudoRandom(K);
2 for i = |V | − 1; i ≥ 0; i−− do
3 Swap node V [i] and node V [R[i] mod |V |];
4 end
5 for i = |V |+ |W | − 1; i ≥ |V |; i−− do
6 Swap node W [i− |V |] and node W [R[i] mod |W |];
7 end
quence of pseudo-random numbers denoted as R (line 1). Then, the first |V | pseudo-random
numbers in R are used to shuﬄe the left nodes in BG (line 2-4) while the pseudo-random
numbers generated later, namely |W | are used to shuﬄe the right nodes (line 5-7). Each
pseudo-random number swaps two left (right) nodes. At the end of Algorithm 7, both left
nodes and right nodes are shuﬄed in a reversible manner. Later, during decoding phase,
given the same key, the same R can be obtained (line 1). The same two groups of pseudo-
random numbers in R are used to recover left nodes (line 2-4) and right nodes (line 5-7)
respectively. Here, both the algorithms have a complexity of O(|V |+ |W |).
C.3 REVERSIBLE EDGE PERMUTATION
Algorithm 9: Edge permutation: encoding
Input : Bipartite graph BG = (V,W,E[|V |][|W |]), key K.
Output: Permuted bipartite graph BG.
1 R = PseudoRandom(K);
2 for i = 0; i < |V ||W |; i+ + do
3 Swap edge E[b i|W |c][i mod |W |] and edge E[bR[i] mod |V ||W ||W | c][R[i] mod |V ||W |) mod |W |];
4 end
The encoding and decoding parts are shown in Algorithm 9 and Algorithm 10 respec-
tively. In both the algorithms, same R can be obtained through the perturbation key (line
1). Then, we use the first |V ||W | pseudo-random numbers in R to perform |V ||W | rounds of
swap operation (line 2-4). In this way, by reversibly performing the swap operation during
the decoding phase, the original order of the edges can be recovered. Here, the algorithms
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Algorithm 10: Edge permutation: decoding
Input : Permuted bipartite graph BG = (V,W,E[|V |][|W |]), key K.
Output: Bipartite graph BG.
1 R = PseudoRandom(K);
2 for i = |V ||W | − 1; i ≥ 0; i−− do
3 Swap edge E[b i|W |c][i mod |W |] and edge E[bR[i] mod |V ||W ||W | c][R[i] mod |V ||W |) mod |W |];
4 end
have a complexity of O(|V ||W |).
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APPENDIX D
REVERSIBLE LOCATION DATA PERTURBATION
In this section, we present the pseudo-codes of the algorithms proposed for the reversible
location data perturbation, including the pseudo-codes of reversible global expansion and
reversible pre-assignment-based local expansion.
D.1 REVERSIBLE GLOBAL EXPANSION
The reversible global expansion (RGE) algorithm is shown as Algorithm 11. To perform the
ith forward transition in the anonymization process (loop 3 to 25), the selected segments
and the candidate segments form a table that contains |CloakA| rows and |CanA| columns.
(line 4 to 6). In the table, each transition value is assigned to one forward transition and its
corresponding backward transition simultaneously so that these two transitions have same
ID. The transition value in table cell (i, j) associated with ith row and jth column is computed
by ((i − 1) + (j − 1)) mod |CanA|. Since the transition values for these potential forward
transitions are different, the key can distinguish them clearly and select a unique forward
transition from them (line 7 to 12). Here we note that the perturbation key can uniquely
choose one backward transition. The key is used to generate a sequence of pseudo-random
numbers and each pseudo-random number controls the selection of one transition. The ith
pseudo-random number, denoted by Ri, is responsible for both the i
th forward transition
and {n− i}th backward transition. Therefore, for the ith forward transition and {n− i}th
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backward transition, the same value can be uniquely determined by the pseudo-random
number and the current cloaking region. This value, called picked value, can be calculated
by pi = Ri mod |A| and it is used to select the transition with the transition value same as
the picked value (line 13 to 19). After updating CloakA and CloakU (line 20), the algorithm
stops when required δk and δl are met (line 22 to 24).
Algorithm 11: RGE
Input : Road network graph G, original segment su, perturbation key Ks, user defined δk, δl, σs.
Output: A cloaking area CloakA and a set of users CloakU .
1 Initially, CloakA = {su}, CloakU = {users on su};
2 currentSeg = su;
3 while dist(currentSeg, su) ≤ σs do
4 for j = 1 to |CloakA| do
5 Add the next neighboring segment to candidate set CanA;
6 end
7 Sort CloakA, CanA;
8 row = index of currentSeg in CloakA;
9 for j = 0 to |CanA| − 1 do
10 column = j;
11 transitionV alue[row, column] = (row + column) mod |CanA|;
12 end
13 R = PseudoRandomNext(Ks);
14 pickV alue = R mod |CanA|;
15 for j = 0 to |CanA| − 1 do
16 if transitionV alue[row, j] == pickV alue then
17 nextSeg = CanA[j];
18 end
19 end
20 Update CloakA and CloakU with nextSeg;
21 currentSeg = nextSeg;
22 if |CloakA| ≥ δl and |CloakU | ≥ δk then
23 Return CloakA, CloakU ;
24 end
25 end
D.2 REVERSIBLE PRE-ASSIGNMENT-BASED LOCAL EXPANSION
The reversible pre-assignment-based local expansion (RPLE) algorithm is shown as Algo-
rithm 12. In the RPLE algorithm, both the two transition tables contain E × T empty
cells initially (line 2), where E = |εG| (line 1 to 2). Each of them has E rows and
each row, which stands for a segment within G, has one forward transition list and one
backward transition list with size T . Since there is a one-to-one correspondence between
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the two tables, once we fill the forward transition table, the backward transition table
is automatically filled. For each segment s in G (loop 3 to 25), it first establishes the
neighboring list by calculating the n-hop neighboring segment. Like RGE, the calcula-
tion of n-hop neighboring segment can be done separately. After that, from line 7 to 24,
it updates the forward and backward transition tables together. For each segment s in
G, it tries each neighboring segment from its corresponding neighboring list, and treats
that segment as potential segment sp to form a transition relationship (line 8). Then,
it begins to update the forward transition list of s and backward transition list of sp.
Algorithm 12: RPLE(Pre-assignment)
Input : Road network graph G, original segment su, temporal key Kt, spatial key Ks, transition
list length T , user defined δk, δl, σt.
Output: forward transition table FT , backward transition table BT .
1 E = No. of segments in G;
2 Initially, the E × T FT and BT are empty;
3 for each segment s in G do
4 for i = 1 to E do
5 Add next neighboring segment to the neighboring list NL;
6 end
7 for i = 0 to E − 1 do
8 Potential segment sp = NL[i];
9 Initialize empFT and empBT with size T ;
10 for j = 0 to T − 1 do
11 if FT [s][j] is empty then
12 Put j to empFT ;
13 end
14 if BT [sp][j] is empty then
15 Put j to empBT ;
16 end
17 end
18 emp = empFT ∩ empBT ;
19 if emp ! = ∅ then
20 selPosition = emp[0];
21 FT [s][selPosition] = sp;
22 BT [sp][selPosition] = s;
23 end
24 end
25 end
Since the two transition tables are filled gradually, the algorithm first checks the available
positions of row s in forward table and row sp in backward table (line 10 to 17), then takes
the intersection that gives the empty position shared by the two transition lists (line 18)
and finally choose the left most shared available position to put sp in the row s in forward
table and s in the row sp in backward table (line 19 to 23). Therefore, by checking the same
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position of the two rows, we can do the transitions between s and sp in anonymization and
de-anonymization phases.
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